The problem of God
in the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AI  – *Adventures of Ideas*, New York 1961
CN – *The Concept of Nature*, Cambridge 1920
MT – *Modes of Thought*, New York 1968
PNK – *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge*, Cambridge 1919

For the full list of works by Alfred N. Whitehead see Piwowarczyk, 2008a.
When in the first years of the 20th century Alfred N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell began writing their monumental, four-volume work *Principia mathematica* [1910-1913], no one seems to have thought that after the publication of the first three volumes, the former would withdraw from the whole undertaking. It is not that Whitehead considered the foundations of mathematics, and in particular the set theory, the theory of cardinal, ordinal and real numbers to be of little importance, but over the years during which his ideas had been evolving he decided that he had better apply the mathematical and logical methodology to deal with something that would guarantee a more substantial way of thinking, which, from his renewed point of view, was a return to metaphysical reflection. Naturally, progressing in his scholarly research he did not lose sight of formal sciences, methodological issues and (especially) the natural sciences, although he was more and more inclined to metaphysical synthesis, the fruit of which is process thought.

Without entering into critical discussions with the contemporary Originator of process metaphysics (A.N. Whitehead himself viewed Heraclitus’ ancient variabilism and partly also G.W. Leibniz’s concept of monadology as a certain anticipation of process thought), it should be noted that the speculative, and at the same time extremely logically ordered system developed by him, is undoubtedly unique in the perspective of the latest philosophy. Without ignoring the undeniable contribution and originality of 20th century non-analytical philosophies (mainly phenomenology, philosophy of dialogue, existentialism, Thomism), it must be stated that currently it is the different shades of analytical philosophy with its not so much anti-metaphysical as rather anti-systemic attitude that are dominating. In the gamut of philosophical thought, A.N. Whitehead’s proposal and, by the way, the tradition of neo-Thomism, which is already well established in philosophical culture, is particularly valuable and, as such, invites to a constructive, critical discussion.

This book consists of four chapters whose main purpose is the gradual reconstruction of Alfred N. Whitehead’s metaphysical process thought [for his life see Lowe, 1998 and 1990; and Maćzka, 1998]. Chapter One entitled “In search of the essence of being” is of an introductory character and puts in order the terminology used. Its contents clarify the analysis and meaning of the conceptual grid developed and applied by the Creator of process philosophy, which makes it possible to take to crucial steps: (1) to understand Whitehead’s concept of entity and (2) to answer the
question whether the ontic basis of reality formulated by him can be solved within monism or rather metaphysical pluralism.

The next three chapters aim at an adequate understanding and justification of the otherwise controversial thesis that A.N. Whitehead’s metaphysics lays groundwork for a panentheistic vision of the world. The whole contents reveal successively different aspects of the relationships that exist between the ontic structure of the cosmos described by processualism and the existence and agency (nature) of God. Consequently, the question of the specificity of the actual entity, i.e. its self-creativity, arises here, and therefore the question of whether and to what extent God interferes or can (creatively) interfere in the field of the entity’s internal dynamism and creativity (Chapter Two: “The self-creativity of the actual entity and the problem of God”).

Then, a major problem is what scope and intensity should be attributed to Divine agency, which on the one hand is ontically distinguished (transcendent in relation to the processual composition of the cosmos), and on the other hand, necessarily entangled in the evolving nature (Chapter Three: “God’s agency in relation to the processual architecture of the world”). Finally, a key question arises about the type of relationships that characterize the processual structure of the world and God himself (Chapter Four: “The Problem of Divine Nature and panentheism”).

In the background of this research there arises a question, fundamental for the general overtones of process philosophy, whether its non-theistic interpretation is possible or not. It seems – and this is the thesis of the analyses undertaken in the book – that its metaphysical nucleus is in a way naturally theistic. This means that the category of “God” introduced into the whole system is not just a complement to the system’s substantive integrity, but is – on many levels – primordial.

The research undertaken in the book is the result of the author’s many years of lectures given on the history of contemporary philosophy and metaphysics. Although the author takes a keen interest in classical philosophical thought, including mainly classical realistic thought, still – as mentioned above – process philosophy with its metaphysics (and theology) of process and its theodicean background, bring a very valuable climate of metaphysical nature into philosophical discussions of the first decades of the 21st century.

The book’s contents largely refer also to some of the findings presented in the author’s unpublished doctoral thesis, entitled “Relations between the world and God in the perspective of St. Thomas Aquinas and Alfred N. Whitehead” (Lublin 1999, typescript, University Library of the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin), prepared under the supervision of Professor Zofia J. Zdybicka USJK (from the Congregation of the Ursulines of the Agonizing Heart of Jesus), whom the author would like to thank and express his gratitude.
The maximalism of Alfred N. Whitehead’s philosophical approach is best exemplified in his concept of entity. It is a completely original concept and innovative within the non-metaphysical contemporary thought. Particularly it is worth emphasizing that the thought contained in Process and Reality – to adduce to the remark already made in “Introduction” – is a thoroughly metaphysical vision of the world. Indeed, it is metaphysics (ontology) with a different orientation than classical metaphysics (mainly Aristotelian and Thomistic), which nevertheless explores fundamental topics aimed at showing a coherent and maximalist vision of reality. As Whitehead put it, metaphysics is a field of knowledge which, by its very nature, strives to discover general ideas which, as general ones, are necessary to an explanatory analysis of everything that exists – or to use his own precise terminology – of everything that occurs [Whitehead, RT: p. 80, footnote 1].

(a) main categories of process metaphysics

Processualist understanding of the cosmos brings about a peculiar reflection on entity as the basic building block of the world. The latter is understood here as one great organic process of the entity’s becoming. Process-understood reality is in its essence a process, which is still oriented by inclination in the area of constant processing and shaping newer and newer forms. As seen, the basic category that emerges from such an image of the world is process, which is a permanent, and by its nature creative progress, an advancement towards novelty. It follows that the cosmos is constantly evolving, which means that it is not static. On the contrary, it is characterized by continuous development, shaping new forms of entity. The core of the world, therefore, is dynamism, permanently repetitive openness to the field of emergence of new, ontic possibilities [cf. Whitehead, PR: p. 33; see ibid., p. 177-178; see also analyses carried out by Placek, 1995].

Charles Hartshorne formulates this motif even more clearly. In order to show the specificity of this approach he characterizes existence as an ontic basis for the development of the cosmos, de facto identical with the category of “creation”. In this interpretation “to be” and “to create”, i.e. to be something creative by nature, is in fact one and the same. Being is another form of creating, the constant emergence of new forms of entity [Hartshorne, 1983: p. 1. See in-depth studies on the subject: Piwowarczyk, 2008; see also P. Gutowski’s synthetic approach, 2007].
The very category of “becoming”, ideologically and substantially connected with creation, appears also, naturally, in different optics, in Martin Heidegger’s thought who describes, in this case a “limited” entity that refers to man himself, in the perspective of what is besorgen; that is in his relation to objects, he speaks of being as being-becoming. And this being means constantly becoming a worried user in the field of objects, both inanimate and animate, but excluding the world of other people [Heidegger, 2002: p. 161].

Returning to the views of the Author of *Modes of Thought* himself, one should pay attention to the distinctions made by him in the selection of terms used in his writings. Describing the architecture of cosmos, Alfred N. Whitehead applies the concept of change and process. Thus, characterizing the essence of change, he posits that it is an orderly succession, a peculiar sequence of stages in ensuing scenes of the revealing actual entities. The latter contain an ontically directed phaseness. Against this background, the process itself is simply an ontic condition for change, i.e. – excluding the connotations of a substantive understanding of entity in the spirit of metaphysics of Aristotle or St. Thomas Aquinas – it is, as it were, a subjective basis, an ontic ground. It is an ontic niche that guarantees the basic characteristic of entity, which is its internal dynamism. It is precisely this dynamism – the foundation of creativity – that is the principle determining the concrescence that is characteristic of every actual entity. It mainly provides the metaphysical structure of entity, constituting its concreteness, as well as being the basis for its development phases (the very concept of concrescence and its role in the metaphysics of the process will be discussed twice more in the following parts of the book) [For in-depth analyses of Whitehead’s ontology see J.A. Jones, 1998].

Naturally, such an ontic constellation of the actual entity requires additional detailed description, which A.N. Whitehead does by introducing the whole context of other terminological components of his system. The already signalled epistemic cogency of the very understanding of process as well as change is closely related to the category of event as a specific “replacement” of the notion of actual entity and actual occasion. This conceptual system is complemented by the category of eternal object, which reveals many connotations with the Platonic concept of the world of ideas, and the category of feeling, which has some kind of analogy with the Leibnizian attempt to describe the monad [see Gutowski, 1993: p. 143ff.; cf. idem, 1995: p. 28; see Tupikowski, 2001: p. 6-7; Verley, 2007. A precise guide to the whole map of the conceptual grid used by A.N. Whitehead is presented by E.M. Kraus, 1979].

Let us mention here, by the way, that J. Życiński, the commentator of A.N. Whiteheadian metaphysics, expresses his conviction that the postulate of the concept of the possible entity, possible in the sense of pure (ideal) being, i.e. the building of formal structures on the model of Plato’s idea fits well with the postulates of the Author of *Adventures of Ideas*. [Życiński, 2006. See the analyses, on the basis of J. Życiński’s thoughts, conducted by D. Luty, 2017]
Lecturing on his own vision of the ontic structure of the world and thus not accepting the key solutions of classical metaphysics (mainly Aristotelian and Thomistic realistic metaphysics), A.N. Whitehead provides the ontology of processual, dynamic concrescence of the actual entity. The central complaint made against the findings of Stagirite concerns the foundation of his metaphysics, which is the category of “substance”. In the Author’s opinion, the substantialist image of the world constitutes a static vision of the cosmos [see Kowalski, 2005; Żuchowski, 2003]. The one in the light of which it seems to be devoid of something most important, namely the internal, ontic dynamism, as well as the whole intricacy of being related to its ontic “environment”, which is made up of other actual entities, i.e. entities whose natural basis is constant active changeability. In this context the actual entity is not comprehended as a certain physical (in the spirit of Newton’s mechanistic physics) “simple location”. It also cannot be treated as a simple “bit of matter”, because the latter, without creative references to other components of the ontic system of entities, would be something static by nature [Philipson, 1982: p. 48].

The remarks made so far allow us to draw a preliminary conclusion that an actual entity is an entity that enters into an endless intertwining of ontic relations with other actual entities. It is an entity subject to constant transformations, i.e. an entity whose principled ontic register is becoming, and therefore a creative, infinite process. Reality, experienced in a common-sense, but also in a scientific perspective, reveals itself as a world of constant change, the world of becoming, development, but also manifestations of destruction, which only confirms the fact that to exist, and thus to be a real, actual entity, is in fact to be in a constant process [Philipson, 1982: p. 44; see in more detail: Palter, 1960].

It should be pointed out again that Alfred N. Whitehead strongly rejects substantialist explanations of reality. He views it as a static approach to entity and, in a sense, a negative one. He believes that the substantial understanding of the entity, there is a clear lack of ontic (and necessary) dependence of one static substance on others (“in the philosophy of organism – he posits – it is not ‘substance’ which is permanent, but ‘form’” [PR: p. 34]). Meanwhile, in order to exist at the moment, in order to be in the process, every actual entity requires the existence of other actual entities. The category of actual entities applied by the Author of Modes of Thought as a primordial and elementary philosophical category – as J. Życiński, an expert in the philosophy of process emphasizes – is a reflection of predominantly anti-substantial metaphysics. He adds thereby that such a thought measure aims to

(1) emphasise the mutual and at the same time necessary correlations that exist between the various components of the world, and

(2) demonstrate the world’s dynamism [Życiński, 1988: p. 85].

From the current characteristics of the principles of process metaphysics it follows that the world emerging in the process of evolution as an organized system of
actual entities, being by its nature an ontic dynamic structure, constitutes an organic unity, while it is a unity constituted by a combination of various relations. The architecture of these relations – let us recall – is mainly organized on the basis of this fundamental building block of reality, which is always the actual entity. The aforementioned experience – purely common-sense, but also methodically guided – convinces us that in the cognitively accessible world there is nothing that has a greater degree of reality than actual entities. They, also referred to by A.N. Whitehead as “actual occasions”, are an organic system of real things, and they are the ones that ultimately form the basis of the constitution of reality [Whitehead, PR: p. 22-23].

As such, posits our Philosopher, actual entities are the smallest and still indivisible components founding the structure of the existing and permanently changing world (let us mention here that this very intuition unambiguously reminds of G.W. Leibniz's understanding of the monad). Such a view reveals some substantive connotations with the ancient, atomistic theory of Democritus, with this fundamental difference, however, that the actual entities do not demand assumption of their materiality (for the historical context of A.N. Whitehead's thoughts see Ford, 1985). On the other hand, of course, it does not mean that their ontic composition only overlaps with processes of psychological or purely spiritual nature. What is more, the semantic field of the name “actual entity” is extremely capacious. It concerns both the reflection on the approach and understanding of the one-of-a-kind Entity, which is God, as well as the whole natural gamut – expressed in the language of Thomistic metaphysics – of contingent beings (ontically unnecessary) [Życiński, 1988: p. 85].

Further analysis of the understanding of the world by the English Philosopher leads to the conviction that the whole reality is thoroughly event-dynamic in nature. It is characterised by an incessant constituting by virtue of a system of various interdependencies. It is interesting that the events themselves, understood as a sequence of actual occasions entering into mutual relations do not identify with actual entities. These, being the smallest elements of the cosmos, are understood as momentary entities. The actual entity, therefore, considered to be actual – the very momentary occasion, always remains in a specific relation, that is, it has a reference to its future occasions. Moreover, it interacts with its ideal patterns (sui generis ideal equivalents), which are eternal objects. Events, on the other hand, constituting a structure of actual occasions, being effects of “prehension, are characterized by a feature of unity in this sense that they are not understood as a simple accumulation of components, but as concrete objects in their being. There is an analogy between the metaphysical understanding of the event and the physical interpretation of spacetime. The latter is a certain system demonstrating the natural ability to combine teams – larger entities into units. The event is something similar to such a temporal-spatial unit [Whitehead, NSW: p. 80; Philipson, 1982: p. 48ff.; Życiński, 1988: p. 86ff.].
The above mentioned sequences of occasions are not treated here as certain isolated portions, but as a strictly defined structure of dense connections, a “society” to which Alfred N. Whitehead refers to by the Latin term *nexus*. *Nexus* – the network of such occasions (events) is both current and concrete. Presenting a diagram of the metaphysical categories he uses, he writes: “[…] nexus is a set of actual entities in the unity of the relatedness constituted by their prehensions of each other, or – what is the same thing conversely expressed – constituted by their objectifications in each other” [PR: p. 28 and 269].

Thus, the *nexus* in question communicates the real, actual, individual facts of the *togetherness* of the actual entities. These, in turn, as real (actual), are concurrently

(1) individual and
(2) particular

in the same sense in which the very actual entities and their prehensions are real (actual), individual and also particular.

Therefore, Whitehead emphasizes the fact that all actual reality and all its ontic sectors form such a coherent *nexus*. “Every nexus – he continues – is a component nexus, first accomplished in some later phase of concrescence of an actual entity, and ever afterwards having its status in actual worlds as an unalterable fact, dated and located among the actual entities connected in itself” [Whitehead, PR: p. 24. p. 269; see also Tupikowski, 2001: p. 8-9].

Beginning with the description of the internal constitution of the microcosmic actual entity, the Author of *Adventures of Ideas* focuses his attention on the characteristics of the macroscopic reality. He notes here that the present world understood as *nexus* – the world constituted by the structure of actual entities – sinks on the plane of subordination of this *nexus* in the actual world, thus being above the plane of actual entities. Every actual entity refers, in its own right, to the whole of the actual world and to other entities as actual occasions. Constituted by a sequence of occasions, the entity-event is a basic, natural element of nature. As a result of the internal constitution of the actual entity, realized in its past phase (in the temporal sense) and concretized in the present phase, the event is a plane of direct experience. Therefore, an event is what marks its presence when

(1) it is-exists, and
(2) where it is [Whitehead, PR: 33; PNK: 62].

For the sake of additional explanation, let’s add here that in his late philosophical creation, i.e. at the stage of metaphysical creation, the English Thinker slightly broadened the meaning context of the term “event”. “The word ‘event’ – as he promptly explains – is used sometimes in the sense of a nexus of actual entities, and sometimes in the sense of nexus as objectified by universals. In either sense, it is a definite fact with a date”. A little earlier, in *Process and Reality*, he writes in the
chapter on “Extensive Continuum”: “I shall use the term ‘event’ in the more general sense of a nexus of actual occasions, inter-related in some determinate fashion in one extensive quantum” [Whitehead, PR: p. 90 and respectively: p. 269].

Thus, the event, being the most concrete fact accessible to human cognition, can be expressed separately from other facts occurring at the same time, or past facts [Whitehead, CN: p. 189]. Each time an event is recognised, it is unveiled as a separate content. The content, which in its (by nature) relational structure is always unique. It follows that the basic property of all occasions is their ontic extension. “Occasions are – as J. Jusiak interprets A.N. Whitehead’s intentions – elements of a homogeneous (i.e. connecting elements obtained through the same analytical procedure) relation of extension” [Jusiak, 1992: p. 70-71].

The Creator of the process philosophy himself expresses a firm conviction that there are no elementary events, i.e. events in the sense of a conglomerate of parts or some other “components” of reality that might be part of specific events. He notes that all existing events are part of some other events and also contain other events. An interesting cosmological theme appears here, namely that events seem to be primordial in relation to the categories of “time” and “space”. This leads to the conclusion that the above mentioned extension of events is a plane of experience of both time and space. Moreover, although all spacetime relationships are derived from extension, they and the extension itself are derived from events [Whitehead, PNK: p. 74 ff; see remarks made by Jusiak, 1992: p. 72].

As a basic metaphysical category, events

(1) are unique in their structure, and
(2) never change.

Including past events (i – past phase), they become part (ii – present phase) of other events that are realized in the future (iii – future phase). Their changeability lies in the fact that in their development they create a sui generis organic passage. However, it is not a changeability in the strict sense, but a constant entering into the weave of new relations to other events concretized in the present.

This continuous flow of events makes the whole reality, in its fundamental basis, a single, great creative progress, the irreversibility of the past time, and thus the constant emergence of new forms. However, creative progress itself does not identify with the simple fact of the passage of time, or with the constantly perceived passage of events. Thus, it takes place both in time and space, and is therefore something much more than just a process of actual events exposed by an observer. It turns out, therefore, that the mentioned creative progress – becoming – allows for a communication of an innumerable number of cognitive prehensions [Whitehead, PNK: p. 61-62; Jusiak, 1992: p. 72].

This will be the subject of analysis in the second and third chapters of the book, but already now it seems appropriate to make a few remarks about Whiteheadian understanding of the actual entity in the context of the notion of concrescence and
his internal creativity. Let’s start with the remark that in its internal architecture each actual entity is subject to specific phases of development connected with four different forms of feeling:

1. conformal feeling,
2. conceptual feeling,
3. simple comparative feeling, as well as
4. intellectual feeling (so-called comparative complex feeling).

Feelings are the basic type of relationship that takes place between individual appearances and eternal objects. As P. Gutowski emphasizes in his study of the metaphysics of process, such a feeling should not be interpreted in a panpsychist way [Gutowski, 1995: p. 60; see Tupikowski, 2001: p. 10-11; Leśniak, 2018: p. 118-119].

Every actual entity is understood as an act of experience of what is cognitively given. And in this context, the process of perceiving of many such data consists in moving from their objectivity to the subjective fulfilment of the actual entity. In order to broaden this perspective, let us add that the problem of “feeling” of the actual entity is very closely related to the issue of prehensions. In Process and Reality Alfred N. Whitehead writes: “That there are two species of prehensions: (a) ‘positive prehensions’ which are termed ‘feelings’, and (b) ‘negative prehensions’ which are said to ‘eliminate from feeling’. A negative prehension holds its datum as inoperative in the progressive concrescence of prehensions constituting the unity of the subject” [Whitehead, PR: p. 28; cf. PR: p. 54 and p. 98-99. Whitehead devotes much space in the third part of PR: p. 256-326] to the explanations of the understanding of feeling.]

In this field of explanations let us return to the issue of the process of concrescence of the actual entity. So it is possible primarily thanks to its internal structuring, which in turn is based on ontic creativity. As such, creativity is the principle of the creative development of the world. It itself is not an actual entity, but an ontic basis for the process of self-creation, which is a fundamental feature that characterizes every actual entity. This is how self-development is complemented by the process of concrescence. And although the latter – notes J. Życiński – is one of its manifestations, it does not identify with it [Życiński, 1988: p. 86-87; Tupikowski, 2004: p. 21].

The fact of creativity can never be separated from individual creatures because it is their principle, but on the contrary – creatures are the basis for its realization. Therefore, N. Lawrence, commentator of Religion in the Making, explains: “‘Creativity’ is the term that Whitehead gives to that factor whereby novelty is recurrently introduced into the temporal World. It should not be regarded as a thing apart from the ‘creatures’, i.e., actual occasions, but rather as an aspect of each of them” [Lawrence, 1968: p. 263; cf. Whitehead, RT: p. 79; see Weber, 2005].

Creativity is therefore the principle of any ontic novelty. Every actual entity is therefore an absolutely novel entity; an entity diverse from the other entity in the “many” which it constantly unifies. This means that creativity introduces novelty into the content of this many, which is the constantly disconnecting universe.
Therefore, creative development is the application of this ultimate principle of creat-
tivity to every new situation (ontic event) for which it is the beginning. The ultimate
metaphysical principle,” explains A.N. Whitehead, “is the advance from disjunction
to conjunction, creating a novel entity other than the entities given in disjunction.
The novel entity is at once the togetherness of the ‘many’ which it finds, and also it
is one among the disjunctive ‘many’ which it leaves; it is a novel entity, disjunctively
among the many entities which it synthesizes” [Whitehead, PR: p. 26].

In the philosophical essay Adventures of Ideas, there also appears expression “ac-
tivity factor” used interchangeably with the term “creativity”. In every initial situ-
atation there is an element which is the reason for the occasion of a new experience.
In this context, Whitehead also uses such terms as the “initial phase of the new oc-
casion” and “real potentiality”. Creativity is therefore an update of potentiality. The
process of updating is the occasion of experience. That is why our Author makes
a strong statement here, convincing that the process of creation, which takes place
on the basis of creativity of an entity, is a necessary form of the unity of the whole
icosmos [Whitehead, AI: p. 208-209].

These preliminary findings now allow us to make a few remarks linking the
net of actual (contingent) entities with God. The universe, dynamic in its intern-
al structure, made up of a sequence of short-lived entities (occasions) appears as
a great, harmonious process of cosmic creativity. So the very self-creativity of the
entity as well as of the whole cosmos as an area of the realization of ordered phys-
ical laws, achieves its actualization thanks to the influence of this principle of har-
mony, which is guaranteed by the most perfect Actual Entity – God. In its unique
ontological status, he provides all actual entities with something like the initial aim,
and therefore a primary orientation towards the goal. It is on this ground that every
momentary-actual entity is created. However, every actual entity is naturally spon-
taneous in its action, which consistently implies that God does not force it to ac-
cept these or other forms and directions of development, but only makes proposals
to it. Therefore, in the strict sense, the English Philosopher posits that God is not
(or rather does not have to be) the Creator of the world (in any case not in the sense
that Thomistic metaphysics views it) because every actual entity is in its inner na-
ture so constituted that it is characterized by possessing creative power [Whitehead,

Charles Hartshorne, Alfred N. Whitehead’s follower, asserts more or less the
same. Also in his opinion, each and every actual entity is creative by necessity, i.e.
creative by virtue of its own nature, by virtue of its own internal ontic constitution.
It follows that, in fact, to be an actual entity means to be a creative entity, but – con-
sistently – also the other way round. Thus it is not possible for there to be

(1) creativity itself apart from the actual entity emerging from the process of
constant concrescence,
but on the other hand, respectively, it is not possible for there to be
(2) an actual entity beyond its natural niche and its ontic (necessary) condition

In order to explain the final foundations of the process of concrescence and cre-
ativity of entity, the co-author of Principia Mathematica refers here to the existence
of so-called eternal objects, which are an ontic bridge for the rational clarification
of the whole structure of reality. Characterized by the ontic status similar to the ideas
in the Platonic world of pleroma, eternal objects manifest their real presence in
the world of actual entities. The latter, as things that exist in time (see the tempo-
ral phases mentioned above), are created by participating in things that are eternal.
“In such a philosophy the actualities constituting the process of the World are con-
ceived as exemplifying the ingestion (or ‘participation’) of other things which con-
stitute the potentialities of definiteness for any actual existence. The things which
are temporal arise by their participation in the things which are eternal’ [Whitehe-
ad, PR: p. 53].

And because the whole process of evolution and all minor observed changes imply
the realization of the infinite field of possibilities of actual entities (events), eternal
objects constitute and order the framework of the ontic rationality of the world.
This is all the more so because eternal objects are subjectified as subjects in the so-
called primordial nature of God, in a way constituting it (this will be discussed in
further parts of the book) [Mays, 1977: p. 74ff.; Życiński, 1988: p. 87-88; see Cobb,

In this ontic structure it is important that between the observed events and eternal
objects there occur various, mutual relations. The basic fact that distinguishes
them is that events are by their nature extensive – they have a spacetime feature and
are therefore subject to a continuous flow of their subsequent phases. Eternal ob-
jects, on the other hand, are elements which do not have the feature of extensive-
ness. They are neither spatial nor temporal, which means that they do not have any
developmental phases. Another important difference between events and eternal
objects is that events are concrete and not abstract. The eternal objects, on the oth-
er hand, represent the abstract dimension of nature, in a way its atomistic aspect
Jusiak, 1992: p. 84ff.].

Further on, it is interesting that the metaphysical analysis of reality encounters
a fact, on the one hand, of
(1) its natural variability,
and, on the other hand,
(2) the relative identity of at least some of its parts.
Thus, the known world reveals a kind of “rupture” into two types of worlds: (A) one
world – filled with the intertwining of relations between actual entities and the other
– (B) the world of invariable beings, ideal formulas, mathematical forms. Thus, reality reveals itself as a process of constant ingression of abstract eternal objects into the structure of changing actual entities. Eternal objects play the role of integrating reality, entering into the cosmic process of the becoming of the world, they form it from within. These objects are equivalents of mathematical structures which model and rationalise natural phenomena and give them the shape (concrete, experimental form) available to experience.

It follows from this that there are two categories of the fundamental types of entities:

(i) actual entities, and
(ii) eternal objects.

Other types (manifestations) of entities only communicate the way in which the said basic entities relate to the whole ontic, organic environment of the world [Whitehead, PR: p. 27-28; Gutowski, 1992: p. 47].

(b) between ontic pluralism and monism

On the basis of the introductory remarks made above, an attempt can now be made to reconstruct the metaphysical image of the world emerging within the metaphysics of A.N. Whitehead’s process. Gifford’s lectures published in Process and Reality contain his already crystallised metaphysical views. The concept of reality outlined in them – let us recall – shows nature (ontic organism) as one great field of the realization of the actual entity, which is its basic category. The actual entity, constituted by successive phases of development, is the primary building block of reality (like the monad in the philosophy of G.W. Leibniz). The base of such a structure of reality – let us mention it one more time – is a process, constant becoming, progress towards the realization of ever newer, forms that are creative by nature [Whitehead, PR: p. 33].

As already mentioned in the first paragraph, in the concept of reality presented by A.N. Whitehead, his attitude to the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept and understanding of substance as a basic category of being is of fundamental importance. According to the author of Adventures of Ideas, the notion of “substance” is cognitively redundant because it introduces a static concept of being. Besides, it implies the understanding of being as already definitively constituted. A being that is somehow forced to realize such and only such forms (substantial forms) that are generated by its most fundamental basis: the subject, i.e. the substance (gr. ousia). “In the philosophy of organism – emphasizes our Author – it is not ‘substance’ which is permanent, but ‘form’. Forms suffer changing relations [...] Actual occasions in their ‘formal’ constitutions are devoid of all indetermination” [Whitehead, PR: p. 34].

Rejecting the category of “substance”, Whitehead wants to give the nature in the process of development a thoroughly creative, dynamic, spontaneous (free) character in the adoption of ever new forms. All ontic determinations, apart from the ne-
cessity of not exceeding the principles of logic (principles of rationality) or the laws of nature, are treated here as manifestations of a substantialist attitude in the natural understanding of the universum [Whitehead, PR: p. 23. 34-35. and then: p. 102. 183. 241].

It seems, therefore, that the necessary consequence of such a position is to indicate another basis for change, more in line with the processual concept of reality. According to the English philosopher, this fundamental component – a constitutive element completely different from the Aristotelian understanding of being, in which it was the substantial form that played a central role – is the actual entity. Therefore, J. Życiński emphasizes that the introduction into the system of actual entities which are an elementary metaphysical category highlights A. N. Whitehead’s anti-substantialist attitude towards metaphysics. It is about emphasizing all relations between the components of the observed nature and, above all, emphasizing its dynamism and creative development. S.M. Philipson interprets the intuitions of the author of the process metaphysics in a similar way, who claims that there is nothing more real than the actual entities. “In Whitehead’s system these entities are viewed as the fundamental pieces of which reality is composed. They are the furniture with which the universe is made” [Philipson, 1982: p. 28; Życiński, 1988: p. 85. The issue of the substantiality of metaphysics by A.N. Whitehead is discussed in the work by M. Rosiak, 2003].

In the whole metaphysical characteristics of the network of actual entities, it seems important to note that it is difficult to grasp their nature, that is, to capture and expose some of their original, most basic constitution. Although, as A.N. Whitehead himself says, only actual entities are characterized by the concrescence (ontic reality) of existence, they lack some ground, an ontic foundation. Where does this difficulty come from? So actual entities – let us consider it again – de facto do not have either a material or a psycho-spiritual nature. Their ontic status implies the existence of organic correlations, i.e. specific sequences covering both physical and material processes, as well as – for example – human internal experiences [Życiński, 1988: p. 85-86; Gonzalez, 1971: p. 91ff. The issue of ontic and anthropological uniqueness of man – including the question of the autonomy of the human psyche in relation to determinants of biological nature – is addressed by M. Słomka, 2016].

Consistently demonstrating the processual, metaphysical structure of reality, the author of Process and Reality searches for its basic elements, but only such components whose ontological basis would explain reality in all its richness. Although the actual entity is the primary element of the process of concrescence, it does not exhaust the entire content of the wealth of nature. This is because the actual entity is coupled with

(i) the entity’s creativity, inseparable from the basis of the process,

(ii) an unlimited combination of relationships and interactions between entities,
(iii) with the category of feelings and prehensions; and
(iv) its necessary links with eternal objects [Lowe, 1951: 400ff.; see also Lisiak, 1997: p. 159-169].

Therefore – let’s repeat after A.N. Whitehead once again – the basic, absolutely primordial kind of entities includes – (A) actual entities and correlated with them – (B) eternal objects. All other classes of entities express so much as much they exist in reality in their relation with all the others. Such a prehension and explanation of entity (actual entity) opens the way towards presenting the vision of reality as
(1) pluralist,
(2) relational by nature, and finally
(3) resistant to allegations of panpsychism on the one hand, and materialism on the other [Whitehead, PR: p. 30; Życiński, 1988: p. 93-94. 98; Dziadkowiec, 2012; Gutowski, 1995: p. 89-90].

Returning to the themes and terminology outlined above, let us add here that in the presentation of an organically coherent image of reality, Alfred N. Whitehead devotes a lot of attention to the issue of the entity’s creativity. So by fundamentally questioning the model of the static cosmos – the static one, because based on the concept of substance – as posited by classical philosophy heretofore (Aristotle, St. Thomas of Aquinas, E. Gilson, M.A. Krąpiec and others), he drifts towards the sui generis reinterpretation of the Heraclean panta rhei principle. Creativity having no semantic overlap with the actual entity (though constituting its condition) is an ontic principle of the self-creation. Every actual entity is open to continuous development, to becoming, to taking on new forms. Therefore, characterizing the category of the entity’s creativity, A.N. Whitehead stresses that “‘Creativity’ is the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact”. Whitehead, PR: p. 25; see p. 102. 106].

Thus, creativity as a basic niche of the process of creation and functioning of the actual entity has a dynamic character. It determines the shape of the creative development of the world, defines the course of events in order to achieve ever new forms. It is an ontic basis for concrescence. It is an ontic principle of novelty. As a basis of transition it unifies the many by introducing new forms into it. Creative advance towards what is new is the basis for applying the final principle of creativity to every situation it organizes (“‘Creativity’ is the principle of novelty. An actual occasion is a novel entity diverse from any entity in the ‘many’ which it unifies. Thus ‘<creativity’ introduces novelty into the content of the many, which are the universe disjunctively. The ‘creative advance’ is the application of this ultimate principle of creativity to each novel situation which it originates”) [Whitehead, PR: p. 25-26].

It follows that the category of “creativity” introduced by the Creator of process philosophy is the most general concept of his metaphysics. It appears as a kind of link between the category of “one” and the category of the “many”. Creativity has the character of a process, a kind of transition from what is the “many” to a new form
perceived as “one”, while preserving the organic togetherness of all entities. None of the things is separated from other concrete entities, but by means of feeling – a kind of experience understood in a specific way – each enters into relations with them. To supplement this thought, let us remark here that J. Życiński while interpreting A.N. Whitehead in this respect points to certain analogies between the category of “creativity” and Aristotle’s concept of the first matter (Latin: *materia prima*). In his opinion, their common element is the lack of “concrete determinations”, and they differ in their ontic status. The first matter is passive and static, while creativity is always dynamic and active [Życiński, 1988: p. 86-87; see Mays, 1977: p. 85-86; Whitehead, PR: p. 25].

Whiteheadian concept of actual entity and creativity is deeply connected with the category referred to as “events”. Constituting the most concrete facts that can be cognitively expressed, events are what is-exists, but in such a way that they never return and do not realize any earlier forms, earlier (in the temporal sense) phases of development. Their basic property is the fact of their (physical) extensiveness, which is a source of experience of time and space. This creative progress is not related to the passage of time or a stream of events. It can be presented in an infinite number of prehensions. The flow of events, although indicating creative progress, does not identify with it [Whitehead, CN: p. 53ff. 189; PNK: p. 61-62; PR: p. 90. 98].

An important thread that is present in all of Alfred N. Whitehead’s late writings is a question of interactions between actual entities and eternal objects. “In order for the process of creation and concrescence – stresses J. Życiński again in this context – not to appear mysterious or irrational, Whitehead refers to eternal objects as the ontic guarantor of the rational structuring of sequences of events (*nexus*) taking place in the universe”. [Życiński, 1988: p. 87; idem, 2006: p. 342]. In this context, the author of *Religion in the Making* emphasizes the fact that the reality of actual entities does not exhaust the whole *spectrum* of the cosmos, but it is necessary to refer to the structure of eternal objects, which is not entirely clearly defined. They constitute an ontic basis and condition for the implementation of all those forms for whom actual entities are the experimental reference. These objects, let us note it again, are ideal categories, patterns of things similar to Platonic ideas. That is why our Author claims that objects that constitute themselves in time (past – present – future) are created, formed on the basis of participation in the structure and content of eternal objects [Whitehead, PR: p. 53].

The participation described here guarantees an orderly (coherent), logical arrangement of the whole cosmos. Objects are the basis for nature’s ontic rationality, and are also the basis for the necessary principles that are the carriers of rationality. Entering into the structure of constitutive actual entities, they are the rationale of harmony and the actual constitution of the perceived objects. Thus, consistently, there are two primordial types of entities in the world: (A) events and (B) eternal objects. The first ones decree the fact of movement and ontic flux occurring in
nature, while objects determine its constancy and ontic cohesion. Alfred N. Whitehead himself notes that the properties of objects are fundamentally different from the properties of events. Events are characterized by continuity – because they are individual and thus concrete. The objects are abstract and thus general in nature [Maurer, 1979: p. 497; see Whitehead, PNK: p. 82ff.].

With this amount of analysis it should be noted that by focusing attention on the existence and role that timeless objects play in the process of cosmic creativity, the co-creator of *Principia Mathematica* also refers to the existence and action of God. His role to a large extent harmonize the forces (laws) of nature and gives it its final shape. Eternal objects existing in the so-called primordial nature of God have an influence on the internal constitution of the actual entities from which the world is built. Therefore, the infinite palette of possibilities as defined by the domain of forms (eternal objects), as well as the creativity itself of the actual entities cannot realize its actualization (factuality) in isolation from this absolute ideal of all harmony, which is God. Characterising timeless objects in this way, Alfred N. Whitehead defends their reality. The basis of their reality is their subjectification in a concrete actual entities and – in a different way – in this area of potentiality, which constitutes God’s primordial nature. “Objects constituting the primordial nature of God are therefore also the ultimate *rationale* of evolutionary changes and new structures that appear in the process of cosmic evolution” [Życiński, 1991: p. 86 and 88 (this author writes widely on this subject, among others, in: 2002); see Whitehead, RT: p. 120].

In this way, eternal objects realize their individual essence and also enter into a network of relations with other objects, which also causes their nature to take on a relational form:

1. towards other eternal objects and
2. relational to their physical actualizations in actual entities in their ontic potentiality.

„Eternal objects as such are mere potentials for the definiteness of actual entities, but they are real; they exist whether or not they have ingression into actual entities, though in abstraction from their ingression in God’s primordial nature they would be so ineffective as to be indistinguishable from non-entity” [Nobo, 1986: p. 215].
In the processual vision of reality proposed by Alfred N. Whitehead, what deserves special attention—let us say it again—is the concept of the actual entity which is the basic building block of the perceived material and spiritual world (it is a single, dynamic organism) and the concept of eternal objects, which are a kind of ontic, ideal basis for the realization of the process of the universe’s becoming. According to the Author discussed here, the whole reality appears to be one great, creative process, in which each actual entity develops in accordance with the defined phases of its growth, realizing ever new forms. The organic process, in which the whole universe participates, aims to achieve ever higher degrees of organisation and is characterised by continuous openness. No component of the world is an isolated entity, but it interacts with its other elements and is constituted and organized by the interaction of the network of ideal objects [Whitehead, PR: p. 103].

(a) creativity of actual entities and the unifying role of God

The basic property that characterizes both the actual entity and its ontic background, which is the process or becoming, is creative activity, dynamism, specifically understood creativity [“becoming’ is a creative advance into novelty” – Whitehead, PR: p. 33]. Alfred N. Whitehead himself seems to have attributed different shades of meaning to this term as well as to the reality it designates. However, regardless of the distributed accents, creativity as a fundamental function of the actual entity (sometimes identified with it) is:

(i) the basis for all activities,
(ii) the basis of the ontic energy that triggers the sequence of evolution of organisms,
(iii) the forming element through which the present world has its spatial and temporal framework, constituted by increasing novelty. Moreover,

In the context of the arguments put forward by the Author, he adds that the very cause which organizes and justifies the contingent character of reality, i.e. of the real, should be connected with the fact of creativity and the emergence of new creations
(occasions). Because creativity as such cannot be subjected to isolation from these creations. Therefore they themselves (creations) always remain in the horizon of creativity. This leads to the conclusion that creativity for a given, specific creation is and dynamically becomes a constant companion of creativity, through which it in a natural way passes to the next stage of its development. From now on – in a temporal sense – it reveals itself as creativity for a new creation. It follows that there is a constant transformation, a constant dynamism within the activity (of causality) of creativity taking on new developmental forms, on the basis of new creations following each other [Whitehead, RT: p. 84-85].

Creativity is therefore an essential dimension of the universe's development. It is its ontic background and an update. Being an “ontic feature of the world”, creativity is not an actual entity itself, but an ontic rationale for the process of self-creation which is assigned to specific (all) actual entities. It is a dynamic and active factor, which in fact determines the creative and perspective character of the whole reality. This creative and thoroughly dynamic expansion of reality towards new forms is captured in the notion of concrescence. However, this concrescence is not synonymous with creativity itself, but only one of its essential manifestations. Introducing the category of “creativity” – let us recall the earlier finding – the author of Religion in the Making notes its similarity with the Aristotelian concept of the first matter, but stresses that, unlike the latter, creativity is characterized by activity and dynamism [Życiński, 1988: p. 86-87; see Whitehead, PR: p. 36-37].

Creativity as a principle of novelty, a peculiar ontic basis of the actual entity, fulfills its unifying role, integrating its internal structure. Thanks to it, the actual occasion becomes a new entity. An entity different from the many which it was before unification. It introduces what is new into the content of the many, which is the universe. The actual entity – let us recall this motif here – is therefore in a sense simple (momentary), as a basic building block of nature, and in another, structurally complex, made up of successive phases of development. And although God gives to every actual entity its initial aim, which is its ideal model, in the end, it is the cause of itself. “Whitehead – notes P. Gutowski – assigns all activity to the actual entity. Past entities are completely passive, they cannot act on their own because they have passed away. That is why he defines the new actual entity as the cause of itself; for although this entity is made up of its past predecessors, all activity is on his side”. Whitehead, PR: p. 26; Gutowski, 1995: p. 62-63 and 65].

It is for this reason that Alfred N. Whitehead posits that „the world is self-creative; and the actual entity as self-creating creatures passes into its immortal function of part-creator of the transcendent world. In its self-creation the actual entity is guided by its ideal of itself as individual satisfaction and as transcendent creator. The enjoyment of this ideal is the ‘subjective aim’; by reason of which the actual entity is a determinate process” [Whitehead, PR: p. 103; see Tupikowski, 2000: p. 162ff.].

S.M. Philipson, interpreting in the spirit of A.N. Whitehead's thought the issue of
the formation of current entities and their reference to God, states: “...” God can be termed as the Creator. However, ‘creator’ in this context does not mean that God creates the world ‘out of nothing’, ex nihilo, at the beginning of time. God is not prior to the becoming of the creation or outside it” [Philipson, 1982: p. 57].

Characterizing the evolving world as a fleeting “shadow” and at the same time the ultimate “fact”, A.N. Whitehead enumerates its basic components:

(1) creativity, which is the basis for the realisation of all novelties,
(2) the sphere of ideal forms which, although not real, are nevertheless exemplified in what is real; and
(3) a real, timeless entity identified with God, which transforms the indefinite nature of creativity into a determined freedom.

Thus, an occasion (event) constituting itself in the process of becoming of a temporal character has two sides to it. Being sui generis the “strategy” of the course of creation, the event reveals itself on the one hand, as

(A) the cause of oneself, i.e. one's own peculiar creative act, and on the other
(B) a created work.

Alfred N. Whitehead What explains that every emerging fact is created. However, there cannot exist – he continues – any two actual entities, that is, creativity and its production. Therefore, in the end, there is only one entity, which in essence is a self-creating creature, and thus, by nature, an self-creative actual entity [Whitehead, RT: p. 83-84; see ibid., p. 90-91].

(b) God as a keystone of system coherence

At the beginning of this part of our analyses, it is worth mentioning that Alfred N. Whitehead's metaphysical position focused on the question of God in the creation and construction of the world is very unclear. On the one hand he states that God is the primordial predecessor of any process of transformation, of becoming of the cosmos, a factor that is the primordial and absolute basis that determines any “creative act”; on the other hand he argues that there is no substantive (logical) contradiction between the statements that “God creates the world” and “the world creates God” and maintains that God is not infinite in every (possible) respect, from which it follows that God is something “categorically” determined, somehow predictable and therefore in some way limited [Whitehead, RT: p. 124-125; PR: p. 410].

Referring to this issue, J. Życiński [1988: p. 167] claims, however, that “the God of the philosophy of process is as omnipotent as the God of traditional theism”. Yet making such an opinion he seems to forget, for example, that in the mind of St. Thomas Aquinas, for example, the world is totally dependent on God for its existence, and is therefore fully derived from him. The creative act of God defines a type of relationship which, from a metaphysical point of view, is absolutely non-transfer-
able: the world is totally dependent on God; God is in no way dependent on the reality which he has created.

J. Życiński, on the other hand, maintains that “the basic indicator of God’s omnipotence is [...] the fundamental possibility of achieving certain results,” adding a little further, “free from internal contradictions” [ibid., p. 166-167; see Życiński, 2008 (especially: 2008: p. 365); see Oomen, 2018]. However, it should be emphasized here that also Aquinas is convinced that God is “logical” in His free action. In A.N. Whitehead’s view, however, God does not interfere in the world by introducing any contradictions, but is not a necessary condition for its existence and its ontic perfection.

When addressing the development of the doctrine of the interdependence of God and the world (in processualism this dependence is obvious), L. Elders, on the other hand, notes that in the process metaphysics, unlike in traditional approaches, God is viewed in a completely new way. He reveals Himself in it as the unlimited realization of the fully absolute richness of potentiality. At the same time, it does not exist before, but concurrently with creation. It is an entity somehow parallel to the cosmos. Thus, God is the principle-reason with which each time the final result is initiated. Therefore, the so-called derivation of the Divine nature is a simple consequence of the creative progress (process) of reality by its own nature. Finally, the author states that A.N. Whitehead produces a peculiar type of monism of evolutionary provenance. At another point he adds that the creator of the philosophy of process expresses the conviction that by introducing the concept of the developing, perfecting nature of God, which grows (must grow together with the evolving cosmos), in its essence God is the cause of himself [Elders, 1992: p. 160. 287. The problem of the attempt to reconcile the existence and agency of God with the paradigm of the evolutionary structures of nature is undertaken by Tupikowski: 2008 and 2009].

Consistently, therefore, God reveals Himself here as

1. a postulate of the system coherence,
2. an actual entity entering the world (first of all in its effectual nature),
3. a conceptual, absolute realisation of an area of ideal forms.

At the same time, these forms are a necessary relation between God and reality. As something abstract, forms characterize both the actual occasions and God Himself. Without taking them into account, neither a rational description of the nature of God (aspects of the nature of God), nor nature is possible. Thus, God is sui generis a “conceptual fusion” which brings together all possible ideas – the realization of actual facts. Consistently, He is a constantly developing “road” project, which permanently leads to ever deeper and richer aspects of reality. In the same context, commenting on Whitehead’s thought regarding the relationship between creativity of entities and God, J. Życiński notes: “Creativity cannot be a substitute for the Creator, because it is not an entity that could be expressed in terms of existence”. [Życiński, 1988: p. 185; see Whitehead, RT: p. 125ff.; PR: p. 262-263].
Going further in these analyses, let us note that the vision of God’s nature presented by the author of *Modes of Thought* is far from attributing absolute creative power to Him and from noticing the fact of total dependence of the evolving nature in terms of existence. He defines the thesis concerning God as the Creator of the world as an extreme form of *dogma* that expresses His nature. The world is even necessary for God to manifest His person and to create it, by incorporating into Himself the process of reaching new forms. A.N. Whitehead emphasizes here that in a situation of ontic isolation from God, the actual world would not be possible at all. Correspondingly, also in isolation from the structure of the actual world, together with its natural creativity, no rational view or clarification of God constituting Himself in correlation with the nature would be possible. Therefore, the thesis formulated by Whitehead is unambiguous: “there is no meaning to ‘creativity’ apart from its ‘creatures’, and no meaning to ‘God’ apart from the creativity and the ‘temporal creatures’, and no meaning to the temporal creatures apart from ‘creativity’ and ‘God’”. Whitehead, PR: p. 263; RT: p. 122. 126-127; Cooper, 1974: p. 5.

Following the same path of thought, it is worth noting here the position taken by Ch. Hartshorne, who continues and in many places develops (and makes even more radical) the thought of the author of *Process and Reality*, giving his own interpretation. According to him, God is not a principle of the actuality (existence) of an entity, but only a principle of harmony of nature. God is not the Creator of the world, because – as he sees it – the creation of the many entities and their properties belongs to their own (inbred) nature [cited after: Gutowski 1995: p. 92-93]. J. Życiński, conversely, referring to the issue of a clear definition of the type of relations that occur between God and the world, notes: “[...] maintaining the traditional opposition between God the Creator and the created universe may once again prove to be a manifestation of absolutizing simple categories and extending them onto a reality in which there are much more complex structures”. [Życiński, 1988: p. 181].

In the opinion of Alfred N. Whitehead, the process of creative concrescence adopts such an interpretation because it is founded through a constant, ontic fusion, a kind of unification of God with the world evolving in the creative process. Therefore, the author of *Adventures of Ideas is of the opinion that God as a “principle of concrescence” [Whitehead, RT: p. 145; NSW: p. 182] is a single actual Entity that is atemporal, but which – like all other actual entities – is subject to the process of concrescence. The only sign of God’s “otherness” is the fact that He can influence other actual entities by proposing them an *initial aim* [Susinos Ruiz, 1961: p. 32ff.; Bonfantini, 1972: p. 115ff.]. L. Elders strongly hold an opinion that such a position, however, is a form of camouflaged monism, and this is due to the fact that the self-creationism of the actual entity in its essence excludes the understanding of God as its ultimate and adequate cause [Elders, 1992: p. 48].

In the metaphysical description of the world proposed by A.N. Whitehead, each of its elements affects all the others without exception. This consistently means that
even God cannot deviate from this rule because otherwise he would have to influence the world without being subject to its (inherently necessary) influences. However, by interacting with the world, God develops and enriches himself, thus creating one great process of development. Although it is a unique Entity, He is – like everything else in the present world – subject to a process of self-development. “Thus in Whitehead’s metaphysics,” comments J. Herbut, “God is not a transcendent creator of a contingent world. [...] He does not create from nothingness any actual entities, does not give them existence, but only directs their development and ensures their durability” [Herbut, 1995: p. 203. 205; see Tupikowski, 2000: p. 169-170. On the understanding of the category of “contingency” in A.N. Whitehead, see Weber, 2005, and Weber, 2006].

Let us also note here, following P. Gutowski, that in the system of metaphysics proposed by Whitehead certain features of understanding God as an efficient cause could be found in his concept of the developmental phases of the actual entity [Gutowski, 1995: p. 62]. D.M. Emmet, on the other hand, referring affirmatively to the thoughts of the author of Modes of Thought, emphasizes that A.N. Whitehead would certainly not agree with the approach to the problem adopted by St. Thomas of Aquinas, who believed that the creation by emanation of the whole existing entity (association with Aquinas’ concept of creation with emanationism is misleading) comes from its absolutely primary cause, that is God. On the other hand, he would have recognized that God is a subject who, through his action, provides a kind of ultimate cause, both in the (necessary) process of the self-creation of actual entities, as well as the initial and primordial power, the aim of which is to limit and organize creatures in such a way that at least relative harmony can exist and the process of creative development itself [Emmet, 1932: p. 121; see Tupikowski, 2004: p. 22-23].
As we have seen in the analyses carried out so far, in the processual concept of reality outlined by the author of *Process and Reality*, God appears to be a kind of “referer” in the constantly emerging and evolving reality. It seems that such a characteristic of God is far from attributing to him features of an absolute being. First of all, there is a lack of such fundamental attributes of the Absolute – accepted on the grounds of classical (realistic) metaphysics – as being a primordial entity that is perfect, independent in every respect, and has the rationale of its existence in itself (a gamut of features listed by M. Grabowski, for example in 2017: p. 37). God’s role here is limited to giving “initial aims”, which may or may not need to be taken into account in the creative process of concrescence. The fundamental category that replaces God’s efficient causality is self-creativity, i.e. the self-creation of the actual entity.

(a) God as the rationale of the “field of rationality“

As we can see from the above analyses, Alfred N. Whitehead’s thought introduces the concept of God’s influence on the world which is fundamentally different from classic Aristotelian and Thomistic metaphysics. The system of metaphysics outlined by him, in a declarative – realistic layer, paints a completely different image of reality. All nature, captured in the model of one big organism, appears here as a process of dynamic, expansive, multiform development and a composition of variable processes.

Fascinated by the substantive content of Plato’s *Dialogues*, A.N. Whitehead tries to point to many of the intuitions contained therein, which in his opinion are valuable. Therefore, when describing reality in terms of constantly becoming actual entities, he refers to a structure of eternal objects – not precisely defined – which, let’s repeat once again, he understands in a Platonic pleroma-like manner, i.e. as the only real, absolutely perfect reality [Whitehead, NSW: p. 79-80; PR: p. 99-102 109-115. 355]. J. Życiński lends support to this intuition of the author of *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge*. “I consistently try to defend the thesis that Whitehead – despite his epistemological sympathies to empiricism – in ontology and the philosophy of God remains a representative of the Platonic tradition. [Życiński, 1991: p. 83; see the same 1988: p. 95-96. 98].

The two fundamental ontic categories pointed up in the thought of the English Philosopher that make up the whole of the becoming reality, i.e. – (A) actual enti-
ties and (B) eternal objects (timeless objects) constitute its ontic, basic structure. In the same mode of argument, J. Życiński further explains that “timeless objects, like Platonic ideas, constitute the basic and general element of these structures, defining the field of potential evolution for all possible processes. By contrast, actual entities are a concrete physical exemplification of the possibilities offered by timeless objects”. [Życiński, 1991: p. 94]. The concept of eternal objects introduced by the author of Process and Reality is – in his opinion – to explain the ontic foundations of the actual entity and to justify the specifically understood intelligibility of the whole structure of actual entities.

Consequently, the mathematical paradigm of nature assumed by Whitehead’s metaphysics is to a large extent correlated with the analysis of the role that eternal objects, also referred to as ideal forms, play in the actual world. Eternal objects are equivalents of mathematical structures, which give form to the phenomena they model. Thus, objects represent abstract qualities of nature, which, apart from aiming at certain relatively defined (stable) forms, is characterized by the feature of divisibility and atomicity. The influence of therefore ideal forms on actual entities results in their relative definiteness and is a guarantor of their rational structure (“That the fundamental types of entities are actual entities, and eternal objects; and that the other types of entities only express how all entities of the two fundamental types are in community with each other, in the actual world” – Whitehead, PR: p. 30) [Whitehead, PNK: p. 62-67; PR: p. 28; see more broadly: Życiński, 1987 and Jusiak, 1992: p. 84-95. On the very mathematical nature structures, see: Lemańska, 2012].

Objects understood as pure (ideal) potentialities enter the process of evolution, thus providing an ontic basis for a sequence of events that do not have the character of a given, concrete fact of material provenance. Therefore, the actual entity as such is the result of a certain creative synthesis, a synthesis always only unitary and transient in time [Whitehead, RT: p. 85]. As a result, in its dynamic and creative structure the entity participates in eternal objects, which – although they have a different status of reality than the actual entities – nevertheless enter into relations with them. “In such a philosophy the actualities constituting the process of the world are conceived as exemplifying the ingression (or ‘participation’) of other things which constitute the potentialities of definiteness for any actual existence. The things which are temporal arise by their participation in the things which are eternal” [Whitehead, PR: p. 53; see Nobo, 1986: p. 215].

Therefore, timeless objects, in spite of their ideality, are real by virtue of the fact that they exist both

(1) in actual entities emerging in the normal course of evolution in nature, and
(2) in a completely different type of onticity, that is to say, in the field of potentiality, which is the property of God’s original nature.

Alfred N. Whitehead even claims that an adequate name for eternal objects would be “universals”. However, he does not apply it in a regular way because of its histor-
ical burden (see dispute over universality) [Whitehead, NSW: p. 165-166; Życiński, 1991: p. 86; see González, 1971: p. 73-80].

Answering the question why the universe is not a disordered, chaotic structure, the co-creator of Principia Mathematica points to God as the principle of concretion, which introduces order and harmony in the process of evolving nature. God, characterised by having a dipolar

(i) primordial and

(ii) consequent

type nature, stepping in, especially in the capacity of the latter, in the process understood as a constant aiming at actuality through a sequence of ideal consequences and – which sounds quite paradoxically – a kind of unification of the entity and non-entity, is the Author of the order and harmony of the cosmos. The cosmos in turn, in its ontic structure, is characterized, as we said above, by creativity, together with the realization of the field of its infinite freedom and infinite panorama of possibilities [Whitehead, RT: p. 98. 99. 101].

In the analogous context W.A. Christian adds: “We might say that in actual occasions the concrescence produces a pure conceptual feeling by abstraction from the physical datum, and that in God the concrescence connects a (primordial) conceptual feeling with the physical datum” [Christian, 1959: p. 293].

Following this trail, let us note that in his flagship work, Process and Reality Alfred N. Whitehead mentions the third kind (or possibly – aspect) of God’s nature, namely the extra or superjective aspect. And he consistently explains: “The ‘superjective’ nature of God is the character of the pragmatic value of his specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity in the various temporal instances”. Whitehead, PR: p. 106]. Interestingly, J. Życiński’s interpretation of this issue goes in the direction of connecting this aspect of God’s nature with human activity. According to such an approach, man would have his own specific contribution to the constitution of the Divine nature [Życiński, 1992: p. 29]. S. Kowalczyk, on the other hand, supports the thesis that A.N. Whitehead calls attention to the “pragmatic and axiological” aspect of God’s nature [Kowalczyk, 1982: p. 304].

In turn, in its primordial nature God is viewed statically, thus constituting a timeless reality composed of ideals and relationships, objective hierarchy of values, patterns, principles, etc. Thus, the perfect actual entity, which is God, guarantees the ontic “rationale” of other actual entities. He designates a kind of field of ontic rationality (including the field of rationally oriented potentiality) in the continuous development of the cosmos, determining and defining the field of all states of things possible to be realized. Thus, the field of rationality referred to constitutes the final ontic matrix, determined by the universum of all possible – within rationality – states of reality, as well as their mutual, multi-aspect relatedness [Życiński, 1991: p. 84; idem, 1988: p. 146; Tupikowski, 2004: p. 24ff.].
God, still developing in His consequent nature, reveals Himself as an actual entity interacting with the world and as such – which seems to be paradoxical – is subject to development in order to achieve an ever higher degree of reality. In this aspect of his nature, God embraces the whole conglomerate of actual entities, contributing to their realization of ideal forms. In its primordial nature, the Absolute is perfect, but only on an ideal-potential plane. In this aspect, God transcends the world, being an actual fact from which it is impossible to detach any other elements subject to the process of formation. However, this process is always characterized by harmony. The influence of abstract forms on actual events is not a work of chance, but takes place in an ontic union with this absolute, ideal harmony of all ideals, which is ultimately God Himself [Whitehead, RT: p. 101.124-125; Herbut, 1995: p. 203ff.].

Returning to the interpretation of God's primordial nature alone, let us note that in its essence it is the basis for the structuring of all timeless objects, ideal forms in a series of abstract hierarchies. Importantly, in this case the actual entity, which is God, does not create these timeless objects, but organizes and structures them in a harmonious hierarchy of mutual, all types of references. On the basis of this structuring of all relational references, God reveals Himself as the ultimate rationale (expressed traditionally – the cause) of both the physical (ontic) order of nature, as well as the moral order, which is the absolute model of personal behaviour. In his analyses of the problem, J. Życiński emphasizes that the eternal objects that constitute – in a way – the primordial nature (aspect of nature) of God, are also the fundamental and ultimate principle of all evolutionary transformations and constantly emerging new ontic structures [Życiński, 1991: p. 87-88; see Jordan, 1968: p. 134ff.; Leśniak, 2018: p. 121-122].

Thus, in its primordial nature, God is the foundation for the whole cosmic process by giving “initial aims” that (only) can be realized (the area of potential). The nature of God is here an unlimited field for the realisation of possibilities. Not existing before creation – let’s recall this motif of analysis again – but with it, God is the principle by which the creativity of the actual entities is not chaotic eventually, but reveals features of rational ordering.

Therefore, referring to the question of relatedness of God’s primordial nature to the emerging entity, as proposed by the creator of the process metaphysics, S.M. Philipson writes: „In this creative process God can be conceived as the source for both novelty and order. Whitehead calls this divine function the primordial nature of God. Apart from God there could be no novelty in the world and the order. In this respect God can be said transcend the world. However, God’s creative activity does not imply that he determines the process. The creative process is best understood as an interplay between God, as a non-temporal actual entity, and all other temporal entities. The things which are temporal arise by their participation in what is eternal”. Further, in the same problem area, he adds: “Creation is, there-
fore, a transition of eternal potentialities to temporal actuality. In this process God evaluates and chooses certain potentialities for what an actual entity might become, which Whitehead describes as ‘the relevant eternal object’. Therefore “God’s impact on the creative process is felt as a persuasive ‘lure’ toward realization, to which the becoming actual entity has freedom to respond” [Philipson, 1982: p. 57.]

Also L. Elders in his (definitely) critical assessment of this position emphasizes that the derivation of the Divine nature is a simple and – in the spirit of A.N. Whitehead’s metaphysics – a logical consequence and an expression of the creative progress of the whole reality. Therefore, let us repeat it once again, he asserts that Whitehead builds a type of “evolutionary monism”. Consequently, in his opinion, such a view of the foundations of metaphysics makes God the ultimate absolute “limit”, and his very existence is revealed here as something ultimately – which sounds exceptionally paradoxical – “irrational”. This is so because God, as the foundation of the actual, is not a concrete entity in its onticity [Elders, 1992: p. 287 (with a footnote)]. Alfred N. Whitehead himself, defending himself against possible critical remarks, says here that it is indeed not possible to reconstruct any adequate rationale of God’s nature, and the reason for this is that it is the same nature that is the basis (rationale) of all rationality [Whitehead, NSW: p. 187].

Commenting on the issue of God’s role in the evolving nature as presented by the author of Adventures of Ideas, Z. J. Zdybicka emphasizes the fact that he assumes an eternal and at the same time actual entity, which de facto is not understood as the creator of the cosmos. The uniqueness of his agency is only limited to the provision of initial plans (aims) guiding the structure of events, and thus it consists in giving them a certain determined form. Thus, God is here the factor that in some way shapes the form of the world. He is the “principle of concrescence” of particular entities and the entire ontic system of the cosmos. Naturally, being just such a principle, God must know all His plans, which He tries to implement in the evolving reality. In fact, these are the “eternal objects” mentioned earlier, in which, by necessity, all actual entities participate. Finally, Z. J. Zdybicka notes that the concept of A.N. Whitehead’s metaphysics is closely connected with the world of Plato’s ideas, and thus with the concept of ideal, mathematical forms contained in the structure of the pleroma [Zdybicka, 1982: p. 118].

Summarizing this part of the analyses, let us note that the understanding of the entity presented by Alfred N. Whitehead presupposes that in its constant becoming, the actual entity (the actual occasion) is in fact the cause of itself. The existence of this being is a peculiar resultant of his own (natural) creativity and ingestion into an unlimited combination of references to other actual entities – actual events, in connection with the impact of timeless objects. It is the latter, making up the content of the so-called primordial nature of God, that are the area of ideal, abstract structures influencing the content image of reality (let us mention that J. Życiński believes that it would be more legitimate to define the primordial, secondary and
superjective “nature” of God through the word “aspect”. The latter, in his opinion, reflects Whitehead's intuitions more precisely [Życiński, 1992: p. 27ff.]).

Thus, the actual entity, independent de facto in its existence from God, is constituted by its inherent self-creativity and correlation with the ideal object assigned to it, which determines its rationality. Therefore, God – the actual entity that continues to develop its reality along with the evolving nature (the aspect of His secondary nature) necessarily fulfils the role corresponding to the definition of the field of rationality (the aspect of primary nature). It does not seem to differ from ideal forms or abstract structures permeating the whole universe, which in turn confirms the monistic character of A.N. Whitehead’s metaphysics.

(b) God as a principle of concrescence

At the beginning of this part of reflections we should take notice that in Alfred North Whitehead’s process metaphysics one can also find some traces of the classically (realistically) understood final cause. The world of variable processes as a complex of dynamic, constantly becoming and interacting actual entities and eternal objects is one more or less specific organism. Contrary to the Aristotle-Thomistic approach, as we mentioned earlier, the ontic basis for reality characterized in such a way is not a substance understood as a subject of the content realized by the entity and its dynamics, but inventiveness, creativity of the actual entity. The principle of “novelty” – becoming as the first reason for the existence of anything – lies at the foundations both of the very existence of nature as well as its comprehensibility.

It follows that the first metaphysical principle (cause) is neither God (in the primary or secondary aspect of His nature), nor the entity itself or its inner creativity. The agency of the actual entity, the constant implementation of novelty is, therefore, its specifically understood subject, the principle of existence. The scope of application of this principle concerns the whole reality, and thus also God, who is in the cosmic process – especially in its secondary (effectual) nature. He is not a person isolated from being subject to the laws of nature, but makes up their absolute, ontic formula (“In the first place – stresses A.N. Whitehead – God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles. Invoked to save their chief exemplification” [[Whitehead, PR: p. 405]] [Whitehead, PR: p. 106; idem, NSW: p. 86. 111; Gutowski, 1995: p. 95-96]; Mascall, 1988: p. 195-196].

The divine nature, considered in its basic (original) aspect as a place of eternal objects – ideal forms, is both the basis and the rationale for the validity of the laws of nature. The primordial nature of God determines somehow the field of rationality and is the source of all logical inferences. According to the author of Process and Reality, respect for the laws of logic – apart from the requirement of the coherence of the system and the ontic necessity – is a necessary condition for the substantive coherence of the whole structure of reality. Thus, God appears as an actual entity, free from any inner contradiction, and as such, he contains in himself a synthesis of the
whole evolving nature. He embraces the whole cosmos, i.e. forms modified by the world as well as the world modified by forms.

The actual reality exists because there is a certain (at least relative) order in the nature of the cosmos. The consequence is unambiguous: if there were no order, there would be no world either. And analogously, because the world exists, on this basis we know and we experience that there is harmony. It follows that the Entity that imposes order in the structure of the cosmos is an absolutely necessary element of this ontic situation which is represented by the actual reality [Whitehead, RT: p. 88-89. 92; see Cobb, 1965: p. 196ff.; Christian, 1959: p. 292-293; Stokes, 1964: p. 8ff].

Let us add here that the category of “order” and “harmony” in the universe, described and explained by the Author of process philosophy, apart from logical connotations, also has aesthetic overtones. The cosmos evolving in the present phase of development, being an organism that brings together all possible actual entities and their connections with abstract structures, as constituted by eternal objects, reveals an essential – as Alfred N. Whitehead believed – aesthetic feature [Whitehead, MT: p. 60-62]. However, it is not only some (added) feature of the world but its necessary, ontic dimension. Actual reality is – let us repeat the above findings – a product of aesthetic harmony and order, and these are a simple derivative of God’s immanence [Whitehead, RT: p. 92-93. The aesthetic, ethical and cultural aspect of Whitehead’s views is examined by D. Hall, 1973].

Therefore – such is the conclusion at which J. Życiński arrives – the compactness of logical inferences present in nature is demonstrated as a special case of aesthetic order which permeates all levels of reality. In this context, detailing this thought further, he emphasizes the fact that in the process of creative, ontic concrescence that we observe, an ontic unification of the evolving reality and God takes shape. He also explains that apart from the structuralising influence of the field of rationality, which cognitively reveals itself as a manifestation of God’s presence in the cosmos, by necessity there would not exist either its development, or any, even just relative, order. This consistently means that

(1) both rationality of human reasoning and
(2) the stability of all physical structures
reveal themselves as a peculiar and at the same time subtle manifestation of the presence of God as a sui generis “Poet of the world” [Życiński, 1988: p. 145-146].

The issue of order appearing in the cosmos is also complemented by the concepts introduced by A.N. Whitehead on the pages of Process and Reality, and these are:

(i) the ontological principle and
(ii) the principle of relativity.

“The two doctrines cannot be explained apart from each other: they constitute explanations of the two fundamental principles – the ontological principle and the
principle of relativity” [Whitehead, PR: p. 173]. The ontological principle defines the framework of rational structures of the world and determines the logical order of the explanatory discourse of metaphysics. “This ontological principle,” the author explains further, “means that actual entities are the only reasons; so that to search for a reason is to search for one or more actual entities. It follows that any condition to be satisfied by one actual entity in its process expresses a fact either about the ‘real internal constitutions of some other actual entities, or about the ‘subjective aim’ conditioning that process” [Whitehead, PR: p. 29; see more broadly, PR: p. 54-57 and 171-172; see also: Kellenberger, 1970: p. 281-289]. Let us mention, by the way, that in J. Życiński’s opinion, the ontological principle introduced here by A.N. Whitehead is essentially close to the concept of efficient and final cause, about which St. Thomas Aquinas speaks in his metaphysics [Życiński, 1988: p. 96].

This principle seems to define the inner “content” of entities in relation to initial aims that God gives to each one of them. These aims can be achieved, but it does not result from an ontic necessity, but rather from a specific understanding of the “freedom” of actual entities. Therefore – as A.N. Whitehead points out – God does not actually create the world, at least not in the sense that traditional metaphysics understands it. His agency is to preserve it, to support its development and dynamism. God harmonizes its multi-faceted growth. “God’s role,” as A.N. Whitehead notes in Process and Reality, “is not the combat of productive force with productive force, of destructive force with destructive force; it lies in the patient operation of the overpowering rationality of his conceptual harmonization. He does not create the world, he saves it: or, more accurately, he is the poet of the world, with tender patience leading it by his vision of truth, beauty, and goodness” [Whitehead, PR: p. 408; see p. 261-262].

The second principle introduced by the Co-author of Principia Mathematica concerns the relative character of reality. It proclaims that every actual entity, having achieved its own satisfaction, becomes the starting point for the constitution of the next actual entity. “Ontological relativism” – in this way also J. Życiński defines this principle and explains its functioning – is revealed by the fact that in an actual entity (An) that is given concretely and individually there coexists with it in a certain sense the preceding actual entities (Aa, ... Am). The whole process consists in the fact that all their relatedness to (An) occurs by virtue of prehensions that organize the essence of the ontic state (Aa). It is also interesting that here, as in the case of the ontological principle, the Polish commentator of A.N. Whitehead’s writings points to the similarity of the solutions proposed by the Author of Adventures of Ideas with the assertions of St. Thomas Aquinas. He claims that the relativism of process metaphysics shows a similarity to the scholastic concept of contingent entities. Moreover, J. Życiński believes that Whitehead’s principle of relativity correlated with the theory of eternal objects can be put into “causal and teleological” categories. [Życiński, 1988: p. 96-97].
According to this approach, timeless objects have such an impact on the development phases of actual entities that—as their resultant—a new appearance, the realization of novelty is constituted. The multiplicity of these appearances creates one large organism of emerging actual entities connected with each other by the category of feeling [Whitehead, PR: p. 171ff.]. In this way, every actuality realised in the world has its own reference to the nature of God. Its secondary aspect is composed of many self-realising elements. Their reference to the nature of God transforms their temporal actuality into an eternally lasting fact. A.N. Whitehead’s conclusion is that the force within which God preserves reality is the one of a kind, the “power of the ideal”, which is ultimately the very nature of God. He goes on to say that God gives Himself to this actual, ontic basis from which all creative act flows. Because of all of this, the cosmos owes its entire ontic vitality to the fact that God Himself and His actions are present in it [Whitehead, RT: p. 126].

Here is a longer passage in which Alfred N. Whitehead, in his own (half metaphysical, half poetic) way reflects the sense of his reasoning: „Thus the consequent nature of God is composed of a multiplicity of elements with individual self-realization. It is just as much a multiplicity as it is a unity; it is just as much one immediate fact as it is an unarresting advance beyond itself. Thus the actuality of God must also be understood as a multiplicity of actual components in process of creation. This is God in his function of the kingdom of heaven. Each actuality in the temporal world has its reception into God’s nature. The corresponding element in God’s nature is not temporal actuality, but is the transmutation of that temporal actuality into a living, ever-present fact. [...] But the principle of universal relativity is not to be stopped at the consequent nature of God. This nature itself passes into the temporal world according to its gradation of relevance to the various concrescent occasions” [Whitehead, PR: p. 412-413].

So finally the function which God fulfils in the evolving nature depends on introducing and respecting laws of nature, principles of logic and aesthetic canons. God, as the principle ordering the cosmos, participates in the process of the world, guaranteeing its rationality. As a peculiarly understood subject of ideal objects (an aspect of His primordial nature), He permeates the whole structure of actual entities, their ontic concrescence, creativity, feelings (secondary nature). So, from the perspective of process philosophy, God reveals Himself as the fundamental, ontic reason for the harmony of the whole cosmos. The reason, the various aspects of which can be described and explained in many variations of the same argument supporting the existence of God. The strength of this argument is the fact that it is a factor that justifies the whole order of contingent reality [Życiński, 1988: p. 98-99. 111; see also, idem, 1992: p. 125ff].

It is cognitively interesting that Whitehead himself seems to avoid connotations with traditional metaphysics. Therefore, he suggests that wherever God is treated –
in Aristotle's view – as the First Mover, we should rather speak of God as the principle of concrescence [Whitehead, NSW: p. 182]. So God appears here as an active factor, which assigns to subsequent sequences of events the structure of ideal references or, in other words, eternal objects. His role is to

(i) restrict and

(ii) exclude certain possibilities from the sphere of actual entities that are becoming [Życiński, 1992: p. 127-128].

The nature of God, His agency as a constant interaction with the world, does not play any role here that contradicts the existence and agency of the actual entity in terms of the ontic structure, but only in terms of logical ordering. Following E.L. Mascall, let us note, however, that such an approach is not exempt from serious criticism. It is essential, as Mascall warns, to preserve caution and not to let oneself be “misled” by Whitehead's understanding of God as a “principle of concrescence”. Associating it with the divine nature does not convince us that God is treated here as the Creator. The reason is that every actual entity in its becoming manifests its own creativity, which consistently means that it de facto creates and ontically constitutes itself [Mascall, 1988: p. 293; see p. 206-207].

Interpreting Alfred N. Whitehead’s views from the point of view of Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics, it is worth noting here that the understanding of the aim as a motive and the end of action in his philosophy of organism is subject to a far-reaching neutralization. For here, God is not a necessary entity that causes the action of the actual entity, because the latter is characterized by an intrinsic dynamism as a derivative of its self-creativity. Certainly, timeless objects as subjects in the primordial nature of God, ideal abstract structures determine the scope of the field of rationality, they provide initial aims, but correlated with actual entities, they are not the rationale explaining their existence. Principle of concrescence – as reserved for God – for events that are becoming, assigns to Him only the role of the guarantor of logical and aesthetic harmony rather than transcendent Good as the source and purpose of the cosmos understood in terms of process.

The Author of the essay Religion in the Making even claims that God's goodness is His “limitation”, and God himself gains the proper depth of actuality by virtue of a harmonious evaluation that imposes order. Furthermore, he adds that it is not true that God is ontically infinite in every aspect. And although it sounds paradoxical, our Author claims that if He were really infinite, He would be both good and evil. This leads him to the conclusion that such an infinite fusion of the essence of evil with the essence of good would land up in sui generis nothingness. Therefore, in his opinion, God is, and must be, a categorically defined being, and hence the conclusion that He is not unlimited [Whitehead, RT: p. 124].

However, it seems that there are no rational grounds for claiming that attributing the ontic reason for good to God must lead to the conclusion put forward by A.N. Whitehead that in this situation there would be a “fusion” of existential
good and evil, as he claimed. In the paper entitled *Why evil?* in response to allegations of this type, M. A. Krapiec observes that the starting point of all claims about God and His nature is and can only be entity – what really exists. Evil should therefore be understood as a lack of (positive) entity. Therefore, there are no grounds for making judgments about God in the perspective of evil. For evil, being in its (negative) *essence* something extremely irrational (it is an obvious lack of entity, as well as truth and goodness), does not provide any rational basis for a causal link with God [Krapiec, 1995: p. 123].

**(c) God as a perfect actualization**

Going further in these analyses, that is, trying to reflect the way God works in terms of His own perfection, it is now worth asking about their metaphysical basis and the justification applied in this field. Let us recall that, in Alfred North Whitehead’s opinion, God – like all other actual entities – is not an exception to the general, universally binding rules of the whole system. Yes, He is the supreme “exemplification” of the laws governing nature – physical laws and logical structures – but He is not an ontically independent being [Whitehead, PR: p. 405; a broad discussion of the role of God as the supreme exemplification of metaphysical principles is undertaken by D.B. Kuspit: see Kuspit, 1960: p. 38-70].

The Author of *Modes of Thought* believes that God is first of all an actual Entity. And although due to its dipolar nature He is distinguished, still as such He is an element of the basic matrix of reality, that is a process which is an

(i) all-encompassing,

(ii) always creative, and

(iii) necessary ontic movement towards novelty.

In this context, therefore, God cannot be viewed as a fully actualised being, because He is constantly (and necessarily) getting involved in the rhythm of the world’s becoming. In fact, when considered as a primordial entity, He is, in His nature, an unlimited, but (only) conceptual realization of the absolute horizon of potential. Therefore, by necessity, in this very aspect of His being, He is never *before* the palette of actual entities (i.e. *before* creatures), but always *with* them [Whitehead, PR: p. 33. 405; see Lowe, 1951: p. 407-408; Tupikowski, 2004: p. 26-27].

Consequently, according to the Author of *The Function of Reason*, there is no need to exclude all potentiality from God’s nature. For if His primordial nature is only conceptual, then it accounts for the lack of fullness of actuality. Its secondary aspect is constituted by Divine “sensations” of the physical nature resulting from His necessary participation in the structure of successive phases of the development of nature. Therefore, the conceptual (primordial) nature of God’s being is characterized by invariability, which is based on its ultimate completeness. On the other
hand, God’s nature is (ontically) secondary by virtue of the creative, by its nature necessary, progress of the world towards novelty.

On the one hand, therefore, A.N. Whitehead emphasizes the fact that God is the most primordial basis determining all creative act, the basis for an increasingly higher degree of reality, but on the other hand, he unambiguously advocates the need for constant actualisation, achieving ever higher forms of concrescence, in a word – the improvement of God’s nature (effectual) through its interaction with the world, i.e. the creation that is also constantly improving [Whitehead, PR, p. 407; Whitehead, RT: p. 125. 127; see Kuspit, 1960: p. 91ff.; Tupikowski, 2004: p. 29; M. Słomka refers critically to treating change in the Divine nature as imperfections – 2018: p. 174].

Here is Whitehead’s longer statement which reflects the specificity, but also the deep controversy of his approach: “God, as well as being primordial, is also consequent. He is the beginning and the end. He is not the beginning in the sense of being in the past of all members. He is the presupposed actuality of conceptual operation, in unison of becoming with every other creative act. Thus by reason of the relativity of all things, there is a reaction of the world on God. The completion of God’s nature into a fullness of physical feeling is derived from the objectification of the world in God. He shares every new creation its actual world; and the concrescent creature is objectified in God as a novel element in God’s objectification of that actual world. [...] God’s conceptual nature is unchanged, by reason of its final completeness. But his derivative nature is consequent upon the creative advance of the world” [Whitehead, PR: p. 406-407].

Going further, let us note that the potentiality of God’s nature is its inherent and necessary property. In fact, although God in some sense influences the creation and shape of subsequent entities (their temporal phases of development), because He contains in His primordial nature their abstract ideas, in His secondary nature, He is nevertheless co-created by the actual entities constituting the evolutionary and alternating image of the world. In this view, God is not the Fullness of actuality in the ontic sense of actualising the world, because every actual entity by itself is the rationale (strictly speaking – the cause) of its existence and content. He is rather a logical and aesthetic condition for the coherence of the system, as a special case of creativity, as a “Poet” of the whole dramaturgy of processualist reality [Whitehead, PR: p. 408].

As we can see, A.N. Whitehead basically does not formulate the central metaphysical question: why does the world exist at all (as G.W. Leibniz does, for example, by asking: “Why is there something rather than nothing? Leibniz, 1995: section 7, p. 103]; see J. Wojtysiak’s in-depth study of the issue, 2008), which is its final, ontic decontradictification. In fact, he does not formulate the question of God’s existence either. Anyway, the question of existence itself, the reality of the entity, including the reality of God, is quite unclear here. The entity does not so much as exist as is becoming. This principle is so universal that it does not exclude the actual Entity
which is God. Thus, He appears in the whole processual system not as the ultimate and, above all, ontic cause of everything that exists, but rather as a mere “necessary condition of noncontradiction, a condition without which it would not be possible to work out any coherent and rational interpretation of reality” [Życiński, 1988: p. 118].

The concept of the ever-becoming cosmos presupposes that existence is only one of many elements of the whole categorial system proposed by the process thought. It is not – let us recall this aspect, important from the classical point of view – substantial existence, but only some dimension (metaphysical approach) of the general cosmic stage of creativity, not excluding God Himself. Applying the principle of relativity mentioned above, A.N. Whitehead believes that each and every actual entity, in order for us to understand its existence, demands a reference to other actual entities. Actuality – the entity’s processual becoming does not only characterise the entity itself, but also by other entities – and God Himself [Whitehead, PR: p. 34. 62. 171-173; Philipson, 1982: p. 62ff. 72-73; Cooper, 1974: p. 62-64]. Let us mention here that in the article Creativity as Ultimate: Reflections on Actuality in Whitehead, Aristotle and Aquinas [Schindler, 1973], D.L. Schindler critically refers to the issue of “the actuality of process” as the basis of existence of the entity, demonstrating argumentative deficiencies of this type of metaphysical reasoning.

Returning to the main thread of these reflections, it must be stated that Whitehead’s antithesis (the content of which we will quote in the fourth chapter of the book) laid down in Process and Reality must be interpreted in an unambiguous way. They result from the author’s understanding of the entity and correspond to the whole system. In this light, there is no opposition between the assertions conferring upon God certain

(i) stability,
(ii) transcendence,
(iii) creative power,
(iv) perfection,
and their logical opposites [Whitehead, PR: p. 410].

The question about the existence of the world or about the existence of God is not justified here. God cannot give existence to other entities because He is Himself dependent on the world. The latter, by the way, is chronologically and logically before God. “Why God or the world exist at all is completely unaccounted for” joins the discussion in his work Does God Change? T.G. Weinandy. “Neither can account for its own existence, and neither can account for the other’s existence. It is impossible for God to give ‘being’ as an actual concrete reality is totally dependent on the world; and thus, if anything, the world exists chronologically and logically prior to God” [Weinandy, 1985: p. 141].

So God is not a self-existing entity. He is dependent on His own creation, with which he shares the same creative rights [Jordan, 1968: p. 130ff.; Lawrence, 1968:
p. 279-285]. A profound criticism of St. Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of the nature of God, His creative omnipotence and perfection is carried out by B.Z. Cooper [1974]. He does so by forgetting, however, that the concept of the existence and nature of God in Aquinas’ view results from his realistic concept of being. Therefore, it is not some kind of a priori theory, serving only the cohesion of aesthetic canons (which can be clearly seen in A.N. Whitehead), but resulting from the analysis of palpable reality. So God is for him first of all the ultimate (absolutely only one) de-contradictification of reality’s existence its comprehensibility. This does not mean at the same time that this God is not the Creator of the beauty of the world, the laws of nature or that He does not guarantee the correctness of logical inferences.

It follows from the above analyses that, according to Alfred N. Whitehead God is, although honoured, only one of many actual entities. He is in His effectual nature:

1. a potential entity, and therefore
2. without the ultimate impact on
   (2a) either the existence of the universe because every element of it enjoys self-creativity,
   (2b), or on the shape of processual progress, since its components may or may not take into account the initial objectives that He proposes.

Thus, for the Creator of the philosophy of process God cannot be an ontic fullness. Moreover, He cannot be the Absolute with the highest degree of attributes because then He would limit the free, creative progress of the world, so much so that this progress is the fundamental foundation of the whole architecture of reality. He does not, therefore, give existence in the most basic sense of these words (He is not the efficient cause), but merely guarantees aesthetic impressions, logical coherence and coherence of the system.

Let us quote here the position of John B. Cobb, a strong supporter of solutions derived from process metaphysics: „Creativity as the material cause of actual entities, then, explains in Whitehead’s philosophy neither what they are nor that they are. If the question as to why things are at all is raised in the Whiteheadian context, the answer must be in terms of the decisions of actual entities. [...] the decisive element in the initiation of each actual occasion is the granting to that occasion of an initial aim. Since Whitehead attributes this function to God, it seems that, to a greater degree than Whitehead intended, God must be conceived as being the reason that entities occur at all well as determining the limits within which they can achieve their own forms”. J.B. Cobb further suggests that God’s role in giving existence is more fundamental than his texts suggest. However, recognizing creativity as an ontic foundation of reality, he emphasizes: „Fundamentally they mean that God also is an instance of creativity. For God to be at all is for him to be a unit of creativity. In this respect his relation to creativity is just the same as that of all actual occasions” [Cobb, 1965: p. 211-212].
In the whole processualist panorama of explanations, it is not so much a question of giving the final, existential reasons for the existence of the world in relation to God’s agency, but rather a certain logical order of the categorial system. Existence is some kind of relation (but not in an ontic sense) connecting God with the structure of the world. However, this is a feedback (transitional) relation because

(1) the world needs the existence of God’s initial aims,

Chapter four

THE PROBLEM OF DIVINE NATURE AND PANENTHEISM

The issues connected with the attempt to describe God’s nature – despite its differences from the classical approaches – are also reflected in Alfred North Whitehead’s metaphysical system. However, at the very beginning of these analyses it is necessary to point out a certain objective difficulty connected with the unambiguous interpretation of his statements concerning the nature of God. When it comes to the characteristics of the Entity of God in the perspective of revealing His attributes (properties), the problem arises that Whitehead does not expound consistently on this subject. All information about God’s qualities most often comes from the context of understanding his entire metaphysical system.

Nevertheless, interpreters of the metaphysics of the author of Modes of Thought present the characteristics of these attributes. For example, W.A. Christian in his An Interpretation of Whitehead’s Metaphysics enumerates the following qualities of God: invariability, power, goodness, unity, reference to extensibility [Christian, 1959: p. 382-390]. Let us add here, following M. Piwowarczyk, that among the processualists themselves, a kind of restraint in ascribing to God certain attributes of His nature is connected with the fact that they are understood only in the light of human perception – limited only to the understanding of contingent entities [see Piwowarczyk, 2012].

Let us note that at this level, there appears the way in which the Co-creator of Principia Mathematica approaches the issue of God’s role, His agency in the process of creating the world, as well as the more central problem, which is the question of the rational premises on the basis of which the issue of God’s existence is posed at all. A.N. Whitehead’s understanding of entity – its existence, structure and influence on other entities – is a matter of fundamental importance, and thus determining the results of these reflections. It turns out that while developing his system in the smallest details, the Creator of metaphysics of the process never posed a fundamental question concerning the explanation of the existence of each and every individual actual entity.

Thus, although A.N. Whitehead aims to build a coherent, logical and necessary system of ideas in which all the presented theses would be characterized by applicability (exemplification in the structures of nature) and adequacy, he omits the question of the most fundamental, ontic explanations in favour of logical ordering. To some extent, this state of affairs results not only from Whitehead’s systemic as-
sumptions, but also from the language he uses, which is not always unambiguously interpretive [Christian, 1959: p. 284ff.; Mascall, 1988: p. 206-207].

(a) properties of the nature of God

The evolving nature presented on the pages of *Process and Reality*, which is basically constantly changing, constitutes a relative, organic whole and as such seems to be characterised by a certain (ontic) self-sufficiency. Being determined by the constancy of the laws of physics and the logic and harmony of the processes taking place, and thus constituting one great process [Whitehead, NSW: p. 80], it is a self-creating reality. The actual entity that is characterized by self-creativity as its basic building block, correlated with the structure of eternal objects, constitutes the source of its own existence, the basis of its ontic transformations, of the shape of forms realized in various chronological phases.

It turns out, therefore, that the metaphysical structure of the cosmos presented in such a way – let us recall – does not constitute an ontic and cognitive bridge allowing one to ask a question about the reasons for its decontradictification (i.e. the basis for the final explanation of its existence). God introduced into the Whiteheadian system is not the cause of the creation of the world. He is, as we have said before, at most, an arbitrator of its processual fulfilment. He is, admittedly, a distinguished but still only a fragment of the structure of the whole system [Christian, 1959: p. 335]. This interpretation of God’s agency is therefore exposed to a whole range of critical remarks. F. Susinos Ruiz, for example, in his book *Apuntes para una valoración crítica del organicismo cosmológico de Whitehead*, is definitely critical of such an approach to God’s nature expressed by Whitehead [1961: p. 37-38].

The entity to which the Author of *Adventures of Ideas* assigns the name “God” – notes E.L. Mascall – differs diametrically from the Entity, which classic theism reserves for the existence and operation of the Absolute. In this system, God is by no means the ultimate cause of the world, because it has been somewhat reserved for what A.N. Whitehead describes as “creativity”. This, in turn, appears to be a principle demonstrating its activities in all actual entities. The difficulty of such an approach lies basically in the fact, that also God Himself is subjected to the same ontic (necessary) mechanism. [Mascall, 1988: p. 206]. In this context, J.B. Cobb consistently notes that “[...] God’s independence of the world is relative” [Cobb, 1965: p. 58].

Thus, both the name “God” and the notion “extensive continuum” appear here as a kind of derivative term. For the existence of God as an actual entity is not a simple resultant of the categorical system of metaphysics, but rather results from the nature of the architecture of reality. „God,” W. A. Christian clarifies his point of view, “is not specifically mentioned in any of the categories of existence, the categories of explanation, or the categorical obligations.” And he goes on to argue that “in Whitehead’s intention God is an actual entity, not a being outside the range of the categorical scheme. Categorically speaking, the conception of God like the conception
of the extensive continuum is a ‘derivative notion’. The existence of primordial and everlasting actual entity follows not from the categorical scheme but from the nature of the world” [Christian, 1959: p. 288-289].

Hence, consistently, in Alfred N. Whitehead’s processual thinking, basically there does not exist the problem of God as an entity, who in the panorama of actual entities has some ultimate, absolute status. Such a status is definitely not granted to God, but – which sounds a bit paradoxical – to the unspecified cosmic creativity [Mascall, 1988: p. 196]. J. B. Cobb believes, however, that there is no contradiction between the introduction of the concept of God as an actual entity and the principle that every entity is creative by virtue of its own nature. According to him, God and creativity complement each other [Cobb, 1965: p. 203-214].

Thus, on the one hand, A.N. Whitehead’s introduction to his system of the idea of God as an actual entity and the principle of harmony of the cosmos indicates an attempt to give a coherent vision of reality, and on the other hand – his description of the nature (or even many natures) of God, as well as the terminology used raises many objections. Let us add that soon after the publication of Process and Reality, L. S. Stebbing, interpreting the thought contained therein, wrote in a review: “... Professor Whitehead’s carefree use of language becomes almost egregious when he talks about ‘God’.” [Stebbing, “Mind” 39(1930): p. 475 (quoted after Mascall, 1988: p. 196)].

God is not the transcendent Giver of existence here, but only the One who – by entering the world, preserves it in a certain (mysterious) way. Not being omnipotent, God influences the creation of actual entities only through the fact that He contains their ideas. “In Whitehead’s world – W. J. Hill joins this discussion – every actual entity includes in itself potency, not as delimiting its actuality but as a perfection – as a referent beyond itself driving the world on to constant novelty. In God, this potential is simply inexhaustible; only in this negative sense is it infinite. Divine infinity, then, is not that of pure form but like that of the formal cause of the composite outside of its matter, i.e., the form as ideal and so lacking all actuality” Hill, 1974: p. 149]. In the spirit of maximalism inherent in metaphysics as such, it can be stated after S. Kowalczyk that A.N. Whitehead indeed isolates “theism from creationism” [Kowalczyk, 1992: p. 63. The problem of the limited concept of the Divine omnipotence is addressed by W. Słomka, 2018: p. 184].

Questioning the causal-creative function of God’s agency towards the world, the author of Religion in the Making does not question His role as a (peculiarly understood) principle of limitation of actual entities. God is an essential link in the path of processual transformations, i.e. the impact of abstract eternal objects on concrete, actual entities. This function, however, does not overlap with the classic sense of granting an act of existence (or at least not with creative activity as such), because every actual entity exists by virtue of its own self-causation [Whitehead, PR: p. 100ff.; see Jordan, 1968: p. 136-137].
It follows that it would not be legitimate to assign to God the attribute of infinity by virtue of His causative power. A. N. Whitehead himself stresses that there is no such entity (even God) that would not need any other entity to exist [Whitehead, RT: p. 94-95]. Therefore, while discussing the validity of possible attempts to apply Whitehead’s philosophy to Christian theology, S.M. Philipson notes: “His [Whitehead’s – JT] God is neither absolutely transcendent, nor completely omnipotent. It is sometimes even said that Whitehead’s God cannot be the subject of religious worship simply because this God is too powerless. The God of the Christian religion, it is held, must be completely unlimited” [Philipson, 1982: p. 71].

The resultant metaphysical consequences lead to the conclusion that the God of the philosophy of process, not being a personal Creator of the world, is not infinite in every respect. Presupposing His infinity, as A.N. Whitehead once again emphasizes, would lead to the paradoxical conclusion that God is both an evil and a good entity at the same time. However, such a combination – let us recall this controversial thesis again – would mean an ontic direction towards nothingness. Therefore, in his conviction, God is and must be a creature categorically defined and as such must be “limited”. [Whitehead, RT: p. 124].

Explaining this theme of A.N. Whitehead’s reflection, P. Gutowski explains that “God is not independent of what is happening in the world”. Therefore, “there is a mutual interaction between God and the world,” which means that “God impacts the world” but also “the world impacts God”. And in the spirit of the reasoning of the Creator of the process metaphysics he formulates that “If God were omnipotent in the absolute sense, then freedom would be impossible”. Thus, in the light of “this conception God is […] limited in his power and knowledge by the spontaneity of the actual entities” [Gutowski, 1992: p. 48-49. For the subject of Divine freedom in the context of perfect goodness of God and reasonableness see S. Kittle, 2016].

In the further course of this research it is also worth noting that by introducing the concept of God’s nature, which has different aspects (primary, secondary and superjective nature), the author of Modes of Thought takes the position that the difference between them is a conceptual difference only [Whitehead, PR: p. 405-406; see more broadly: Christian, 1959: p. 289ff.]. In His primordial nature God is

(i) free,
(ii) complete,
(iii) primary,
(iv) eternal,
(v) not entirely actual and, surprisingly,
(vi) unconscious.

Although A.N. Whitehead emphasizes here the fact of God’s primordiality, it concerns only the logical rather than the temporal-ontic order. God – Whitehead be-
lieves – is not a concrete entity, but it is the primary basis for concrete actualities [Whitehead, PR: p. 407; NSW: p. 187].

The indicated incompleteness of actuality of the primordial aspect of God’s nature results from the fact that God’s feelings are only purely conceptual and as such, being isolated from purely physical feelings, they are in fact unconscious [Whitehead, PR: p. 405; RT: p. 124-125; see Łukasiewicz, 2017a]. For the sake of completeness, it is worth noting at this point the position of J. Cobb, who defending the features of infinity of God in the thought of the Author of An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge points to its – as he claims – connection with the concept of Aristotelian prime matter and the concept of creativity of entity proposed by Whitehead himself [Cobb, 1965: p. 206ff.].

Returning to the main theme of the findings made by A.N. Whitehead, it should be noted that although the primordial (conceptual) nature of God as a specific habitat of ideal forms is complete, still in order to achieve full reality and concreteness, it requires implementation at the level of secondary nature, which is fully actual and conscious, although it is not characterized by completeness. “The other side [of the nature of God – JT] originates with physical experience derived from the temporal world, and then acquires integration with the primordial side. It is determined, incomplete, consequent, ‘everlasting’, fully actual, and conscious. God is to be conceived as originated by conceptual experience with his process of completion motivated by consequent, physical experience, initially derived from the temporal world” [Whitehead, PR: p. 407].

Thus, God and nature are interlinked with each other and thus constitute a complementary process of development of all actual reality. In his primordial nature, God reveals himself here as a multitude of potential forms, while in his secondary nature he receives a multitude of present, concrete and individual entities. Therefore, God and the reality given in the knowledge is a dynamic combination of elements of both

(1) durability as well as
(2) variability.

Consequently also of – (1’) unity and multiplicity and of (2’) potentiality and actuality, respectively [Kowalczyk, 1982: p. 305].

Such characteristics of the aspects of the divine nature lead to the conclusion that it is not simple. As a peculiarly understood subject – the place of realization of abstract forms, eternal objects (the primordial aspect of nature), God in his effectual nature enters into the becoming and still dynamic reality of variable processes in order to gain in this way an ever higher degree of concreteness. This is not an unconditional way of God’s existence because without the world it would not be possible to explain in any rational way the ideal (and therefore outside the matter) perception of God that is constituting Himself with this world [Whitehead, RT: p. 127].
Neither is it the pure action of God because the panoply of initial aims suggested by God, aimed at satisfaction of actual entities, may or may not be achieved. The conclusion that follows from the above is that God is not a simple being. God's primordial nature correlated by the mediation of abstract forms with its secondary aspect, immersed in the evolving world, appears to be dependent on Him. Without Him, it would be deprived of the possibility of creative development [Whitehead, PR: p. 260-262, p. 407-408].

So consequently, the attributes of God adopted in classical theism, in this case mainly two – His infinity and non-complexity, cannot be connected with this concept of the nature of God, which is represented by the thought of Alfred N. Whitehead. This is because while in classical metaphysics God is understood as the Creator of all existence (totius esse) and therefore as a transcendent formal and efficient cause. In such a view God appears as an Entity that is infinite and completely (absolutely) simple in His nature. On the other hand – as we have seen – in the concept of the English Thinker, He is only a limited and, in His nature, ultimately an incoherent actual entity, drawing from the world its concreteness and categorical perfection.

Metaphysical achievements of the Creator of Process Philosophy, Alfred N. Whitehead, also does not overlook reflections on the attitude of God – the actual Entity – to the world which is in constant development in terms of its variability and temporality. According to him, the cosmos, which is in the stream of processual transformations, is itself governed by a strictly defined, logically ordered set of physical laws and is characterized by an important dimension, which is the creativity of all its elements. God introduced into the system, although in fact a cohesive factor, is not an exception to the all-encompassing rules, but the main "exemplification" of these rules. Whitehead, RT: p. 128; idem, PR: p. 405].

As mentioned above, the understanding of entity, highlighted by the author of The Concept of Nature, indicates that by being subject to the process of "prehension" in different phases of becoming, it is the cause of itself. Thus, the role of God here is limited to the fulfilment of "initial aims", without the possibility of influencing the existence (concrete reality) of the actual entity. God – through the ideas-cum-eternal objects substantiated in Him – has an influence on the sphere of valuations and qualities realized in the world. In abstracto from God, stresses the English Thinker, there could not be a reality of actual entities, because then there would not be a process of adapting their individual existence. Therefore, the goal that God achieves in the world is the quality of achievement of all these adjustments. Thus, the goal of God is formed in strictly defined "ideals", which continually take into account the current state of reality. For God – Whitehead says – "is not the world itself, but is its "evaluation" in the horizon of value [Whitehead, RT: p. 128].

A serious problem signalled by the Author of Adventures of Ideas is the issue of the actual entities influencing one another, including God's influence. For if we as-
sume that this actual entity referred to as God is never subject to transience, then a fundamental question arises as to how he can influence the realization of these initial aims and the provision of “data” to entities outside Him. [Johnson, 1983: p. 9-10]. Therefore, in the vision proposed by A.N. Whitehead, God – like all other actual entities – reveals Himself as permanently becoming, though not subject to change [Clarke, 1983: p. 257]. Also W. A. Christian defends Whitehead’s thesis of God’s invariability: “God is not absolutely complete, absolutely self-sufficient, and absolutely simple, yet there are intelligible and important senses in which he is one and immutable. He is immutable in the character of his aim, the structure of his experience, and the perfection of his experience” [Christian, 1959: p. 397].

God, therefore, enters the world, develops with it and makes “the process of development, which encompasses everything, be the result of the interaction between the concretizing principle and the individual actual entities. All entities share with God the property of self-development”. [Życiński, 1988: p. 121]. Thus, while respecting in the secondary aspect of His nature the creativity of the actual entity and becoming involved in the process of development, God shares with each new, emerging entity its actual world. “The completion of God’s nature into a fullness of physical feeling is derived from the objectification of the world in God. He shares with every new creation of its actual world; and the concrescent creature is objectified in God as a novel element in God’s objectification of that actual world”. Whitehead, PR: p. 406-407.

Let us add at this point of our analyses that while in the original aspect of His nature God reveals certain features of invariable existence due to its completeness in the conceptual-ideal plane, in the secondary aspect as a “changing world”, entering into it, He acquires full reality and concreteness. And the world as a field of manifestation of the divine nature receives from Him the character of immortality (“The consequent nature of God is the fluent world become ‘everlasting’ by its objective immortality in God. Also the objective immortality of actual occasions requires the primordial permanence of God, whereby the creative advance ever re-establishes itself endowed with initial subjective aim derived from the relevance of God to the evolving world” [Whitehead, PR: p. 409]).

In this context, Alfred N. Whitehead recognises as legitimate the assertion that God can be considered as an unchangeable entity and the world as changeable, and the other way round: the world can be assigned the attribute of invariability, and God that of the transience. The nature of God and the world face each other; they express each other. Temporary events contain the nature of God and are simultaneously contained in Him. The nature of the world is the primordial datum for God and, consequently, the nature of God represents the primordial datum for the world. “Neither God, nor the World, reaches static completion. Both are in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, the creative advance into novelty. Either of them, God and the World, is the instrument of novelty for the other” [Whitehead, PR: p. 410-411].
J. Życiński’s view on it is worth noting here: he believes that the concept of God proposed by A.N. Whitehead is capable of defending itself against the accusation of exhaustion of all the richness of God’s nature in the fact of its participation in the development of the world. Adducing to the arguments in favour of God’s transcendence, he writes: “The infinite richness of possibilities contained in the primordial nature of God cannot be realized in the process of concrescence that constitutes the structure of nature” [Życiński, 1992: p. 138]. However, this position is still controversial because – as it seems – it is in the nature of the Absolute Entity that it should be characterized by internal, ontic unity and absolute perfection. Although it is an exceptional Entity – notes E.L. Mascall in his reflections – it is not the ultimate Entity. It is merely a coincidence of creative activity [Mascall, 1988: p. 207]. However, Whitehead himself seems to defend the thesis of the unity of nature of God by saying that His nature is characterized by an inner, logical consistency in relation to all variability [Whitehead, RT: p. 89].

Analyses presented by A.N. Whitehead show that God is infinitely real. As He enters the world, He gains His concreteness. However, this does not lead to the conclusion that He cannot continually enrich His nature. On the contrary, His effective nature, as “incomplete”, demands perfection through creative efforts to achieve ever new forms [Whitehead, PR: p. 59; see Elders, 1992: p. 181-182]. God’s self-realisable secondary nature is the organic result of His close ties with the world. Due to bonds with the evolutionary nature, God accomplishes His reality and awareness. He is co-created by the actual entities influencing Him. Hence – as A.N. Whitehead concludes – God “does not create” reality, but “saves” it, providing its structure with the ideal of harmony, the ubiquitous order and sense [Whitehead, PR: p. 408; AI: p. 198-200].

In his interpretation of the metaphysics of the process, E.L. Mascall point out that Alfred N. Whitehead does not actually need God as an Entity who enjoys self-existence, and moreover is an Infinite Being, on whose personal love and omnipotence reality depends in everything, especially in its very existence and ontic richness; this Entity is not essential for the cohesion of his system. However, God is necessary for his system, and even indispensable only as a place of subjectification of eternal objects because without such a place all actually real states of things would not be able to realize their own dynamism, which is self-creation. It is true that God’s being provides them with the ultimate cause, but it is (only) an aesthetic cause, which from a metaphysical point of view seems to be only a partial justification [Mascall, 1959: p. 296].

Expressed by Alfred N. Whitehead’s reflections on God’s nature indicate that it should be seen as a dimension of timelessness. The concept of God as a single actual entity subject to concrescence indicates that He is atemporal. For if the change is a transition between the two becoming actual entities, then God – like every actual entity – is constantly becoming, but is not subject to change. [Gutowski, 1995: p. 95-96; this issue is the subject of extensive analyses by J.B. Cobb, 1965: p. 185-192].
The changing world of actual entities maintains its reality and form thanks to its connotations with the world of eternal objects that constitute the primordial nature of God. The “real” entity, “entity” outside of time (in this way A.N. Whitehead defines God [RT: p. 84]), having a dipolar nature and constantly transforming the elusiveness of pure (conceptual) creativity into freedom, makes a peculiar connection between His a-temporariness and simultaneous action in the world. This action is entangled in the passing of time, i.e. the processual passing from one event to another [see Życiński, 1988: p. 125-126. An interesting proposal for a formal “ontology of time” is presented by Bilat, 2018]. Let us mention here, following M. Piwowarczyk, that in the spirit of the metaphysics of process two possible solutions to this problem are indicated. Either

(1) the concept of “timelessness of God” should be abandoned, or
(2) the concept of His “eternal timelessness”. [Piwowarczyk, 2012: p. 310; see Sydnor, 2018].

“God” – B. L. Clarke explains this part of the problem in his article Process, Time and God – “like all finite actual entities, or occasions, participates in both types of process, the genetic process of becoming and the temporal process of transition. God, like any actual occasion, does not change; his relations merely become; they do not change. Also, God’s prehensions in his satisfaction, like the prehensions of any actual occasion, are ordered by the temporal relations, before, after, and contemporaneous with; his satisfaction is coordinately divisible” [Clarke, 1983: p. 257].

God continually grants Himself to creation through the fact that He contains in His being sui generis the synthesis of the entire present reality. Therefore, in His nature there is a double aspect

(i) of the area of forms that are being modified by the world, and
(ii) of the world subject to modifications through the action of forms [Whitehead, RT: p. 88-89 (the question of God’s temporal references to the world in the aspect of the analysis of Divine freedom is addressed by J.W. Felt, 1974)].

It follows – as W. A. Christian remarks [1959: p. 288-289] – that the approach to God as an eternal, permanent actual Entity does not result so much from the categorial scheme used by A.N. Whitehead, as from the very processualist nature of the world. This position is also reinforced by the opinion expressed by B.L. Clarke, who says that all temporary, current occasions are elements of Divine “fulfilment”. Clarke, 1983: p. 258-259; see also Jordan, 1968: p. 134ff.].

A.N. Whitehead refers to the understanding of the original aspect of His nature (“God is the principle of concretion; namely, he is that actual entity from which each temporal concrescence receives that initial aim from which its self-causation starts” [Whitehead, PR: p. 286; see Philipson, 1982: p. 57ff.; Lawrence, 1968: p. 265ff.]), recognizing God as a primordial, timeless case of realizing ideal creativity. In the secondary aspect, by gaining actuality and concreteness, He enters the process of the
developing world, ensuring the relative intransience of actual entities. God manifests Himself as atemporal – stresses E. L. Mascall – only and exclusively in His primordial nature. This in turn has a completely abstract character. This means that He gains de facto actuality in the secondary aspect of His nature. And what is interesting, although God has (probably) his own temporal scale – different from the temporal perspectives of other actual entities – in His secondary (effectual) nature He is absolutely everything, but not in an atemporal sense. J. B. Cobb, in turn, believes that God, whose nature consists of two abstract parts, is everlasting. Besides, he believes that God's a-temporariness does not mean that there can be no process in God [Mascall, 1988: p. 208; Cobb, 1965: p. 187; see Herbut, 1995: p. 206].

In conclusion, therefore, let us note that in the interpretation of the Creator of the philosophy of process, God is the primordial, atemporal (in the aspect of his primordial nature) actual Entity, which, in order to achieve its concreteness and perfection, must participate in the structure of variable processes, appropriate to the temporal entities. Although He is the basis for the “cohesion” of the world, its harmony and internal consistency, still He is subject to change as the chief exemplification of the laws of nature.

H. Maassen in an article entitled Revelation, Myth and Metaphysics: Three Traditional Concepts of God and Whitehead's Dipolar God makes a surprising juxtaposition of the concept of Platonic Demiurge, Christian God – the absolute, omnipotent and infinite Creator – and Whiteheadian God in His dipolar nature [Maassen, 1994]. Then, addressing the issue of the attributes of God, Ch. Hartshorne, the continuator of A.N. Whitehead’s thoughts, formulates the following paradoxical statement: transcendent Divine independence, Divine infinity, invariability and other (inherently negative) terms – the attributes of God are actually necessary aspects of the Divine as such. And still, he believes, what is also legitimate – these attributes also include transcendent and ontic dependence; finiteness as well as changeability [Hartshorne, 1992: p. 89].

(b) the problem of divine transcendence

Alfred North Whitehead’s philosophy of process reflects also the issues related to the attempt to indicate the mutual relations between God’s nature and the world, although there is no substantive parallel between predicating on God’s transcendence and immanence. He believes, however – let us stress this now – the presentation of the nature of God in relation to the evolving nature in the form of the doctrine of His transcendence leads to its unilateral neutralization. Critically referring to historical concepts that show these relations, Whitehead groups them into three doctrines, each of which, in his opinion, is extreme. He speaks first of –

(1) the East Asian concept of God, according to which He is the impersonal principle of the world order. It is a doctrine of “extreme” immanence.
The opposite of this is

(2) the view of the “extreme” transcendence of God represented by the Semitic approach.

And finally, the third position, which is

(3) pantheistic, whose essence boils down to the idea that the only reality of the world is God’s reality, which Whitehead calls “extreme” monism [Whitehead, RT: p. 68-71; PR: p. 403-404; NSW: p. 181 ff.]

A similar approach to the problem is presented by J. Życiński [1988: p. 186-188 (especially p. 187); 1992: p. 135-139]. However, the general overtones of process metaphysics suggest that from the above-mentioned “extreme” approaches Whitehead rejected only the position emphasizing God’s transcendence towards the structures of nature.

Presenting his concept of reality – one great organism in which everything must be interpreted in its basic categories – the co-creator of *Principia Mathematica* takes the position that on the basis of the analysis of the real (current) world it is impossible to come to a statement about God’s transcendence. Any type of argumentation, he emphasizes, which takes as its starting point analyses referring to the ontic character of reality cannot *de facto* be located above its reality. It can only discover and describe all those factors that communicate in the normal experience of the reality of the world. This means – as he concludes – that such justification can discover and try to describe an immanent God, not a fully transcendent God.

A.N. Whitehead’s further argument in this respect concerns Christian theology, which, as he states, has always been under the overwhelming influence of Semitic theology, which accentuates: (A) God’s transcendence, (B) God’s creative power, and (C) His omnipotence. Thus, from the content of the New Testament, the theology of St. John the Evangelist [Whitehead, RT: p. 70-71] remains the closest to the thoughts of the Author of *Adventures of Ideas*.

The above mentioned position of Alfred N. Whitehead is essentially founded on his understanding of entity and, as a result, the architecture of the whole reality. First of all, the “reality” of the world declared by him does not have its reflection in the theory of cognition proposed by him. Although, he states that the actual entity, the basic material of the evolving cosmos, is something that is characterized by reality (“Actual entities – also termed ‘actual occasions’ – are the final real things of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real”), it is difficult to point to such a phase of its concrescence in which it would be fully actualised, i.e. its content would have a specific form. It is characterized by the possibility of making many different (ontic and epistemic) approaches [Whitehead, PR: p. 23-24].

Besides, the “ontic” structure of actual entities, evidently conditioned by the influence of timeless objects that constitute their current forms, seems to differ from the aforementioned “reality” of the world. On the contrary, it leaves many open
questions about the living status of the latter. Thus, in order to explain the overall character of the world – P. Gutowski notices – its changeability and relative identity of only some of its components, two different worlds are needed. One of them is the reality of the actual entities variable by nature, and by the same token momentary. The second is the world – a structure of unchangeable, not necessarily materialized entities, for example, colours, or geometric shapes and the like. Such a world – the world of actual entities is the effect of the ingression into it of eternal objects [Gutowski, 1992: p. 47].

Thus, the basic category capturing the structure of all actual entities is their ontic creativity. It is their most characteristic feature which is

(i) universal,
(ii) fundamental, and in addition
(iii) final.

“‘Creativity is the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact’ says A.N. Whitehead. “It is that ultimate principle by which the many, which are the universe disjunctively, become the actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively. It lies in the nature of things that the many enter into complex unity” [Whitehead, PR: p. 25-26].

Let us remind here once again that in his concept of the actual entity, our Author often refers to the analogy of “monad” as framed by the metaphysics of G.W. Leibniz. At this point it is worth emphasizing that this monadic understanding of the entity allowed the Author of Monadology to come to the conclusion of God’s transcendence towards the world. This is the thought developed by R.C. Neville in his article Some Historical Problems about the Transcendence of God [Neville, 1967].

Thus, the entity (the actual entity) understood in a processualist way is a process of constant becoming, i.e. a creative course towards reaching new, more and more perfect forms. Thus, each (particular) actual entity as well as the whole nature is self-creative by its very nature. Its basic core is a process aimed at implementing new levels of novelty [Whitehead, PR: p. 121-125. 270-272]. “The world is self-creative; and the actual entity as self-creating creature passes into its immortal function of part-creator of the transcendental world. In its self-creation,” says A.N. Whitehead on, “the actual entity is guided by its ideal of itself as individual satisfaction and as transcendent creator. The enjoyment of this ideal is the 'subjective aim', by reason of which the actual entity is a determinate process” [Whitehead, PR: p. 103].

Consequently, God – introduced from the perspective of the metaphysics of the process – appears to be an actual entity, which – like all other actual entities – is creatively involved in the evolution of the entire cosmos. However, the function of God is not to give real, concrete existence to actual entities. Characterized by self-creativity, they do not need a necessary, transcendent external cause [Kuspit, 1960: p. 24ff. and p. 91ff.]. Correlated to the world of abstract eternal objects, they are a peculiar
fusion of relative reality and abstract forms. The reality given in everyday experience is in its essence something (ontically) incomplete. It does not realize such an existential dimension of a concrete material fact, which can be related to the realization of a chronologically past event, but is only prehended from the perspective of the present [Whitehead, RT: p. 85].

Events therefore reach their relative actuality through their necessary reference to the ideal structure of timeless objects – ideal forms and (in a certain dimension) to God Himself [Whitehead, RT: p. 85]. For God, prehended as an actual entity, being the chief exemplification of the realization of all the laws to which the whole cosmos is subject, in its original nature contains the whole ordered structure of ideal forms. In this aspect of His nature, God is the principle of concrescence. As a complete and free entity, through eternal objects, it gives all actual entities their initial aims, which, however, do not determine them. As we have already noted, they can be accepted or freely rejected by them [Whitehead, RT: p. 126; PR: p. 407].

The abstract forms introduced by Alfred N. Whitehead are a necessary link between God and actual entities. Belonging to the nature of God as well as to specific occasions, they are by their nature abstract. Against this background, therefore, God appears as a conceptual “fusion”. On the one hand, He reveals Himself as an actual fact and such a fact from which it is impossible to isolate all other elements that are taking shape. Thus, He realizes the dynamism of the “ideal”, with which He supports and preserves reality. On the other hand, however, in order to maintain its own reality (actuality), it needs the natural world [Whitehead, RT: p. 126-127].

The primordial aspect of God’s entity, therefore, points to certain features of His nature’s transcendence towards the world, although this is only one aspect. Admittedly, the God prehended in it goes beyond the framework of the realization of actual entities, still He is also closely and necessarily connected with them. He becomes involved in the creative process of nature, not being able to remain outside its dynamic impact. Therefore, as the basic “forerunner” of all processes of change, God must conceptually embrace the various kinds of possibilities characterized by physicality. From which it follows that God reveals Himself as a kind of “systematization”, a total, absolute “fact” that is the primordial ground that is a condition for all creative acts [Whitehead, RT: p. 124-125].

What results from the above is that God is completely woven into reality, and through this He is active in every event without exception. Therefore, every real (actual) event also has an impact on Him and consequently demands an adequate response from Him. This means, however, that God is not a transcendent entity either

(i) in His existence or
(ii) in His agency.

The God of metaphysics of the process is essentially an “evolutionary” deity in the full sense of the word. Admittedly, He is in a certain ontic scope and in a cer-
tain metaphysical sense more perfect than the world (the system of entities outside Him), He remains strictly dependent on it. So the whole processual course of the world appears here as a common history in which both God and the evolving reality participate [Mascall, 1958: p. 291-292].

Therefore, it consistently means that in the opinion of the Author of Adventures of Ideas, God is not fully independent of everything that takes place in the composition of actual entities. For there is a mutual interaction between Him and the world in which God constantly influences reality, but it also influences Him [Gutowski, 1992: p. 48]. In this context, J. Życiński interpreting the thought of Alfred N. Whitehead, disagrees with the thesis that the “content” of the original aspect of God's nature is being exhausted in His impact on the world. On the contrary, he states that in Whitehead's view, God is a transcendent entity, i.e. one that goes significantly beyond the framework of physical reality.

In relation to the world itself, he explains that although the latter reveals itself as a sequence of changes and permanent, constantly passing dynamics and processes, everything that passes away ultimately retains its sui generis factuality (reality). This is done not only on the basis of influencing the structure of prehensions and feelings, but also directly in the very nature of God. It is the fullness of actuality and for this reason it preserves the proper factuality (reality) of every actual entity. Thus, God understood in this way is not just an abstract (conceptual – ideal) principle [Życiński, 1988: p. 123. 125].

Thus, in J. Życiński’s opinion, the controversies related to the unambiguous interpretation of the issue of God’s transcendence arise from the specific – in his opinion – approach to transcendence in spatial categories: “The opinion that Whitehead’s God cannot be transcendent in relation to nature seems right as long as we combine the notion of transcendence with spatial parameters.” He further expresses the view that when similar associations are overcome, it will be possible to conclude that God in A.N. Whitehead's metaphysics for many important reasons will be recognized as transcendent in relation to processual reality. He goes on saying that the absolutely infinite scale of richness of all potentiality located in the original aspect of the divine nature cannot be realized in the process of concrescence that constitutes the composition of the cosmos [Życiński, 1992: p. 138].

A similar interpretation is also adopted by W.A. Christian in his work An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics [1959: e.g. p. 8-9 and p. 371-375 and p. 378-381 respectively]: „God is relatively independent of the world, however His existence, and the perfection of his experience in scope, quality, and intensity, do not depend on any particular pattern of events. No matter what actual occasions come into existence, God is in these respects unchangeable. His relative independence of the world follows from God’s primordial character and is part of the meaning of his transcendence of the world” [Ibid.: p. 405-406; see more broadly in works, among

S. Kowalczyk takes a completely different position in his interpretation. Standing firmly in full acceptance of the theism of St. Thomas of Aquinas, he states that Alfred N. Whitehead has completely integrated God’s existence with the space of actual – finite and material – entities. The very (alleged) primordiality as well as the infinity of God understood in isolation from the world is a purely conceptual and abstract phenomenon. All this leads to the conclusion that the full reality (actuality) and the consciousness of God are a simple result of His inclusion in the dynamic and always evolving structure of actual entities. Therefore the ontic community, or even the unity of God’s entity and actual entities is definitely more fundamental than the purely potential and unclear differences that these two realities ontically characterize [Kowalczyk, 1982: p. 306; see similar approach: Mascall, 1988: p. 195 ff. 208; Zdybicka, 1993: p. 88-89; González, 1971: p. 59-168].

Returning to the mainstream of research undertaken in this section, let us also explain that the complex of events that build the image of a processual, changing reality constantly open to the realization of novelty becomes a plane on which the secondary, effective nature of God reaches its – at an increasingly higher level –
(i) completeness,
(ii) the determination and

The category of novelty introduced by Alfred N. Whitehead – argues J. Życiński – cause the new structures realized in nature and more and more perfect systems to make up the image of the world, in which the pride of place should be awarded to God. As an immanent entity in the world, through His additional impact on becoming actual entities, He brings a transcendent feature [Życiński, 1992: p. 135].

This does not mean, however, that God appears to be the cause of the world’s creativity, let alone the cause of its existence. God’s role is limited here – let us reiterate this – to giving the initial aims and harmonizing the structures of nature. Therefore, God influences here the shape, and also the quality of implementation of particular actual entities. Thus, it is one of the many alternative components contributing to the current (in a given time sequence) shape of the cosmos.

Naturally, such an attitude seems to contradict the understanding of God as the transcendent, infinite and omnipotent Creator of the structures of nature. Consequently, therefore, God does not make, or rather – to put it more precisely – does not create the world (the concept of creatio ex nihilo, let us recall, a metaphysical concept on the basis of classical realistic philosophy). God’s main role therefore consists the continuous provision of aims and projects governing actual events, and thus their formation [The problem of creating the world ex nihilo, that is creating understood as establishing a fundamental, ontic dependence (in Latin dependentia)
of the world on God, is analysed by G. Stolarski, 2014; see article: Swanstrom, 2019].

In the dipolarity of God’s nature, God remains the factor that determines complementarily the ever creative progress of all (present and future) potentials. He is the factor that binds together the whole structure of reality. So in separation from Him there would be no world because there would be no “adjustment” of the subsequent individuality of entities. In a word, His direct and basic goal is to indicate and implement ever higher levels of quality, i.e. values naturally correlated with actual entities [Whitehead, RT: p. 90-92. 128-129].

Whitehead’s position on the issue of God’s transcendence is also polarized on the pages of Science and the Modern World, where he unambiguously states that the existence of God is something that is ultimately “irrational”. Therefore, although God is the basis of all concrete actuality, He himself is not concrete. Moreover, as A.N. Whitehead stresses, He cannot be prehended as the foundation of all metaphysical states of things with their deepest dynamism and becoming because in such a situation we should attribute to him not only the cause of good but also evil present in the world [Whitehead, NSW: p. 187. On the concept of so-called probabilistic theism and attempts to solve the problem of evil, see the analyses by D. Łukasiewicz: 2017].

In this connection, the position of Ch. Hartshorne – one of the most famous representatives of process philosophy – is worth noting. In his opinion, God seems to have two types of transcendence based – which is against the principles of logic – on His attributes which are contradictory at the level of meaning. Let us recall his remark about the properties of the divine nature. Both God’s transcendent independence, His infinity and invariability as well as other (negative) terms are necessary aspects of God’s nature. But analogously – as he emphasizes – also transcendent Divine dependence, God’s finiteness and openness to change are such necessary aspects. Hartshorne believes that the transcendence of God occurs in both areas of the above mutual total opposites, which usually are used in the discourse of metaphysics in order to distinguish the entity of God from all other entities. He, therefore, argues that there need be no significant contradiction here. As Whitehead’s position on the two natures of God shows, (possible) contradictory attributes are not predicated here in the same way. This is because divine transcendence is not identical – (i) either with the absolute, (ii) or with infinity, or with any other analogous negation. How is it possible? – asks the Author and in a somewhat surprising way responds with the statement that any one-sided “abstraction” cannot be the object of divine religious worship [Hartshorne, 1992: p. 89].

Moreover, in a critical response to the solutions given by St. Thomas Aquinas, the author of the Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method states that Aquinas gave justifications which he and other processualists perceive as “shallow” and “internally contradictory” [Hartshorne, 1992: p. 90]. Leaning to the opinion voiced you Berdyaev, Ch. Hartshorne further ascertains that classical theism does not give seri-
ous prospects for the emergence of “true understanding” because mystery becomes a human projection here. Referring to his own findings, he states that in the one-sided understanding of God only an abstraction is worshipped, but not God’s essence. In his opinion, this is a kind of cognitive “idolatry” [Hartshorne, 1992: p. 90. M. Słomka believes at the same time that the postulates of processualists guarantee so-called open theism as it is constantly open to ontic (and theological) novelty – Słomka, 2018: p. 183-184. In this context, M. Holda even speaks of a postulate of “new natural theology” – Holda, 2012: p. 212].

It seems, however, that such a one-sided opinion expressed by Ch. Hartshorne cannot be accepted. First of all, it should be emphasized that the criticism of the author of Summa Contra Gentiles does not introduce any substantive contradictions. The fact that St. Thomas of Aquinas ascribes to God both the fact of His transcendence and immanence does not presuppose these internal contradictions. God, according to the Doctor Angelicus is a fully perfect Absolute, which, both in existence and in action, completely transcends the world. He is its ultimate cause. This does not mean, however, that He cannot be immanent, i.e. that He cannot be present in the world of things and people. He is Personal Love, He loves all existence, everything that is. He is the Divine Partner of man. First of all, it should be strongly emphasized here, the philosophy of St. Thomas of Aquinas – who is criticized here – is beyond any doubt theistic. It embraces the concept of God, who is –

(1) the Creator of the world,
(2) the Giver of all existence,
(3) an Entity perfect in every aspect,
(4) a Person.

However, it seems that the above (essential) characteristics of God’s Entity cannot be attributed to the proposal of the concept of God advocated by Ch. Hartshorne and other processualists. It is thoroughly pantheistic, or alternatively, in a more neutral version – panentheistic [see Kowalczyk, 1986: p. 449; Wojtysiak, 2012].

In this context, the analyses formulated by P. Forrest on the subject of metaphysical pantheism are worth mentioning. He claims that “pantheism” itself can be treated as a metaphysical term, which identifies the onticity of the world and God, but also as a term of an evaluating character, and thus significantly broadening this first understanding. In the latter case, he communicates his conviction of the possibility of sui generis religious worship given to the Universe as a whole. Such distinction, in the opinion of the aforementioned author, is a very convenient ground for a substantive discussion with the proposed – among others and above all on the grounds of the philosophy of process – panentheistic concept, in which the world, in turn, is identified with some (at least) “part”, an aspect of the divine nature [Forrest, 2016].

The interpretation of the author of Modes of Thought, therefore, goes in the direction of understanding God as an entity which causes ontic “limitations”, and thus an entity which, by virtue of its own nature, separates good and evil [Whitehead,
NSW: p. 187. See the same, PR: p. 408]. It is also connected with the aesthetic overtones of his metaphysics, according to which God is the “Poet” of the composition of the cosmos, and thus leads it to the realization of the maximum level of truth, good and beauty [Whitehead, AI: p. 305-313; MT: p. 101-103].

Whitehead’s doctrine concerning an attempt to establish relations between the nature of God described by him and the world of nature, finds its apogee in the so-called antitheses placed in the final phase of *Process and Reality*. In view of their particular importance and the many controversies that they give rise to in numerous interpretations of their content, it seems appropriate to cite their wording as a whole. Here is their content (the numbering of sentences comes from the author of the book):

1. “It is true to say that God is permanent and the world fluent, as that the World is permanent and God is fluent.
2. It is true to say that God is one and the World many, as that the World is one and God many.
3. It is true to say that, in comparison with the World, God is actual eminently, as that, in comparison with God, the World is actual eminently.
4. It is true to say that the World is immanent in God, as that God is immanent in the World.
5. It is true to say that God transcends the World, as that the World transcends the God.
6. It is true to say that God creates the World, as that the World creates God” [Whitehead, PR: p. 410].

From their reading it is clear that the *contents*, i.e. the ontic *content* of God’s nature set in opposition to the *contents* (structure) of the world, represents contradictory qualities. Contrary to the friendly interpretations of many processualists, this is not only a terminological convention, but an obvious consequence of the basic assumptions of A.N. Whitehead’s categorical system. Above all, it is the effect of his understanding of entity and – as a result – of adopting a monistic vision of the becoming cosmos. In the proposed perspective of a specific fusion of both aspects of God’s nature and structures of nature – as S. Kowalczyk points out – there occurs an “absolutisation” of reality and “naturalisation” of God [Kowalczyk, 1982: p. 313; see Susinos Ruiz, 1961: p. 36-38. In the context of the analysis of the concept of naturalistic theism see two texts by P. Bylica: 2016 and 2017, and an article written by C.C. Knight, 2009].

The cosmos demands eternal objects that are subjectified in the conceptual (primordial) nature of God. More, it expects from Him its “immortality”. Correspondingly, however, God needs the world, because it is only in its ontic structure that He is and becomes concrete and, moreover, entirely real and conscious [Kowal-
czyk, 1982: p. 313]. Alfred N. Whitehead – writes the same Philosopher elsewhere – affirms the fact of God’s existence, but integrates Him indivisibly and necessarily into the process of transformation of the structure of reality, and thus of the material cosmos [Kowalczyk, 1992: p. 64]. Therefore, S. Kowalczyk believes that Whitehead’s entire doctrine on God is openly monistic and – as a result – pantheistic. God is here “a finite entity, subject to the process of changes and continuous self-creation”, and therefore “arises together with the world and thanks to it” He is what He is [Kowalczyk, 1992: p. 65].

In the light of these remarks, it is therefore difficult to assign to God an attribute of His transcendence towards the cosmos. For if every actual entity has the ability to “transcend” other entities and is characterized by self-creativity, then the role of God is limited only to the function of being the Principle of concrescence as well as the realization of the field of rationality [Whitehead, PR: p. 102-103. 105-106. 259-260. 280-281].

On the other hand, J. Cichoń is a decisive defender of the concept of God’s transcendence in the spirit of the philosophy of process. “In the model proposed by Whitehead, the testimony of God’s transcendence is,” he writes, “that the unlimited range of potentials of God’s primeval nature is not fully actualised in the structures of nature” [Cichoń, 1998: p. 25. On the dialectic determinants and interdependencies of the metaphysical system by the author Modes of Thought, see Jakubowska, 1971]. Thus, God, as an entity which does not fully exist either “before” or “above” the elements of reality, fulfils a role which is completely proportional to the laws of nature. It is therefore a factor that introduces order and beauty into the world [Herbut, 1995: p. 205].

Summing up this portion of the analyses of process metaphysics, let us notice that God is not an absolute transcendent Entity in it. The basic attribute that expresses God’s attitude to nature is above all His immanence. God is not the Creator of the universe, because every component of the cosmos enjoys inherently self-creativity. Also the very existence of God is not independent. For it is unthinkable that God can exist outside the world, that is to say, outside the world’s basic foundation, which is the everlasting process.

Although from the point of view of the original aspect of His nature we can speak of some arguments in favour of its transcendence, in the end, however, in His action towards the structures of nature, God is an entity structurally incarnated in the becoming reality. As the Principle of concrescence, the principle limiting the infinite field of potentialities of actual entities, He is only a distinguished actual Entity. Besides, God is not a transcendent Person who freely and reasonably influences the course of the actual world, especially man, but is an exemplum of the laws of nature, a specifically understood subject that influences the level of aesthetic experience, the validity of the laws of logic and the degree of the cosmos’s order.
Such a position is therefore not theism, but panentheism, or even pantheism as there is a lack of basic arguments in favour of the absolute separateness of nature (or its aspects, as J. Życiński wishes) of God in relation to the world. He is not its creator. He is not fully perfect and independent of the cosmic process. On the other hand, the (essential) elements of A.N. Whitehead’s thoughts that emphasize the neutralization of God’s real (living) influence on the world, His dependence on the structures of evolving nature, limited perfection of attributes and the lack of clear personal traits are very visible [see Wojtysiak, 2012; see also analyses by M. Piwowarczyk, 2005].

S. Kowalczyk – as already mentioned above – is a supporter of the interpretation of A.N. Whitehead’s thoughts in the spirit of pantheism. In his opinion, the “monistic-pantheistic” profile of the metaphysics of the author of Adventures of Ideas can be described as “dynamic pantheism”. In response to Whitehead’s “antithesis” of mutual references between God and the world, he states that they place God within the framework of the becoming world, denying Him the absolute transcendence of an entity. As S. Kowalczyk says, it is His “naturalisation” and at the same time “absolutisation” of nature [Kowalczyk, 1982: p. 313; idem, 1992: p. 64-65; idem, 1986: p. 444-445. S. Kowalczyk explains his understanding of pantheism in the article: 1977; see Clark, 1958].


The authors who disagree with the pantheistic interpretation of A.N. Whitehead’s natural theology and are inclined to describe it as panentheism are, among others: W. A. Christian, J. B. Cobb, J. Van der Veken, B. Z. Cooper, D. Kuspit, M. Jordan, L. S. Ford, W. Lawrence; in Poland, mainly J. Życiński (the author engages in a direct polemic with the position of S. Kowalczyk, accusing him of using “quite strong interpretative methods” in the assessment of Whitehead’s thoughts [Życiński, 199: p. 204]. For more on process-oriented inspirations in the thought of J. Życiński, see Dziadkowiec, 2012 and Holda, 2012), and also W. Skoczny, J. Mączka, and J. Cichoń.

It is worth noting at this point that representatives of process thought use a fairly broad or even fuzzy understanding of the term “theism”. E.g. W. Skoczny writes: “Whitehead’s philosophical theism is a special form of panentheism ...”. It follows that he understands “panentheism” as a kind of “theism“. He also seems to ignore
the fact that theism, as a metaphysical position, proclaims the doctrine of God as a transcendent and personal entity, a perfect Creator of the world. The opinion according to which the postulated panentheism of the author Modes of Thought should be interpreted in terms of theism is also voiced by J. Życiński himself [Życiński, 1988: p. 83. 109-110. 119. 122. 153. 157. 159; idem, 1992: p. 204-205; see Wojtysiak, 2012]. It is worth mentioning here that in a publication popular in the English-speaking world devoted to the justification of theism (The coherence of theism), R. Swinburne stands for the truncated meaning of the term “theism”. He holds that the central problem of theism is the question of the existence of God; he omits here (in the definition of theism) such areas as the absoluteness of God, His personality and others. [Swinburne, 1995: p. 31].

(c) God’s immanence in the world

In the metaphysical part of Alfred North Whitehead’s legacy, reflections on the nature of God play a significant role. Taking a stance to the problem of interactions, the author of The Concept of Nature is of the opinion that the analyses of the “real” world available to knowledge cannot lead to the discovery of a transcendent God, but only to the fully immanent one [Whitehead, RT: p. 70]. God’s Immanence – he seems to suggest – is the basic plane on which any attempt can be made to characterize God’s nature. This opinion is to a large extent founded on A. N. Whitehead’s concept of entity and, consequently, on the determination of the role that God plays in such a vision of reality.

God’s immanence in the structures of the cosmos is somehow imposed with the acceptance of the very understanding of the actual entity as the most basic building block of nature. The actual entity definitely anti-substantially understood [Whitehead, PR: p. 34. 64-65. 159-160; RT: p. 93-94], constituting itself in the temporal stages of development (the previously mentioned sequences of the past, present and future), forms together with other actual entities one big organism. By its very nature, it is self-creative, and thanks to its sensations it is characterized by the possibility of influencing other actual entities. Therefore, in order to be realistic (actual), an entity does not need any external cause. The actual entity, and God is one of them, plays in this context the role of being the Principle of concrescence.

This is the context of A.N. Whitehead’s longer statement, which is in a way a summary of his understanding of the relationship between the world and God: „[...] God is the principle of concretion; namely, he is that actual entity from which each temporal concrescence receives that initial aim from which its self-causation starts. That aim determines the initial gradations of relevance of eternal objects for conceptual feeling, and constitutes the autonomous subject in its primary phase of feeling with its initial conceptual valuations, and with its initial physical purposes. Thus the transition of the creativity from an actual world to the correlate novel concrescence is conditioned by relevance of God’s all-embracing conceptual valua-
tions to the particular possibilities of transmission from the actual world, and by its relevance to the various possibilities of initial subjective form available for the initial feelings. In this way there is constituted the concrescent subject in its primary phase with its dipolar constitution, physical and mental, indissoluble”. And he goes on: „If we prefer the phraseology, we can say that God and the actual world jointly constitute the character of the creativity for the initial phase of the novel concrescence. The subject, thus constituted, is the autonomous master of its own concrescence into subject-superject. It passes from a subjective aim in a concrescence into a superject with objective immortality” [Whitehead, PR: p. 286].

Like all other entities, God needs things besides Him in order to exist. There is no such entity – argues the Creator of the philosophy of process – even when it comes to God himself, who would not need anything outside himself for his existence [Whitehead, RT: p. 94-95]. God, therefore, is no exception. He is an entity distinguished only in the sense that it stands at the base of the transformation process. So He is an actual “fact” from which it is impossible to isolate other forming elements [Whitehead, RT: p. 94-95]. Thus, God is a fundamental exemplification of all metaphysical rationales that bring order to reality (“In the first place, God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification” – PR: p. 405). He is not, therefore, in his essence, an absolute Entity.

Against this background – let it be mentioned in this context – an attempt to describe the divine nature in its dipolarity seems to be of particular interest. Though Alfred N. Whitehead states that while characterizing God, he cannot go beyond the area which he calls the “real world” [Whitehead, RT: p. 70], however, he seems to be looking beyond it for some external decontradictifications. And although he never asks the basic question of metaphysics: why “something” exists at all, which is the reason behind its real existence (Whitehead’s metaphysics does not aim to “explain”, but to “organize logically”. [Mascall, 1988: p. 206-207]), yet in the metaphysical structure of reality presented by him, he resorts to the beyond of the framework of this “real” world. He models an ideal world – like the Platonic one – constituted by a category of eternal objects introduced by himself, influencing the structure of actual entities [Whitehead, PR: p. 27-28. 30. 58-60; RT: p. 84-85; MT: p. 123-124].

In the constitution of the actual world structure, therefore, eternal objects play an essential role: “That an eternal object can be described only in terms of its potentiality for ‘ingression’ into the becoming of actual entities; and that its analysis only discloses other eternal objects. It is a pure potential. The term ‘ingression’ refers to the particular mode in which the potentiality of an eternal objects is realized in a particular actual entity, contributing to the definiteness of that actual entity” [Whitehead, PR: p. 27-28].

It is in this context that the concept of the primordial aspect of God’s nature as a kind of “place” – the subject of the field of rationality – appears. It is the “final on-
tic matrix”, constituted by the eternal objects mentioned above, which are manifestations of God’s nature. God appears here as an “ontic rationale” which, through the influence of ideal objects, brings harmony and order into the world [Życiński, 1988: p. 143-147]. This field of rationality – notes J. Życiński – is not treated here as one of many physical fields, which are still being discovered together with the development of empirical sciences. Its role is absolutely unique. It manifests itself in the fact that this field is the final, ontic “matrix”, whose function is to determine the spectrum of all possible ontic states of reality, as well as their multiple, mutual relations [Życiński, 1988: p. 146. For the subject of mutual relations between God and eternal objects, see Cobb, 1965: p. 196-203].

Therefore, God enters the world as a condition of its rationality. He is immanent in it as a basis for harmony and respect for the laws of logic. Its presence causes that the structures of the cosmos are not chaotic, but ordered in their evolutionary course, and thus rational (“The immanence of God gives reason for the belief that pure chaos is intrinsically impossible”) [Whitehead, PR: p. 131. See Kuspit, 1960: p. 95-107].

Highlighting the primordial aspect of the Divine nature – let us reiterate this theme – A. N. Whitehead states that through the harmonious interaction of timeless objects with actual entities the world gains ever higher levels of order. God’s presence as a principle of concrescence provides actual entities – which are in the process of their development and which influence other entities – with their own activity. Self-creativity is the basic and proper manifestation of all entities. It determines their status (“‘Creativity’ – let us recall – is the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact” [Whitehead, PR: p. 25; see PR: p. 10. 25-26].)

In J. Życiński’s opinion, God does not impose His projects through some kind of deterministically understood necessity, but reveals a palette of ideal patterns and ideas as an aim of (potential) activities for the network of particular actual entities. God therefore respects the ontic autonomy of these entities [Życiński, 1988: p. 121]. However, it should be emphasized here that the limitation of God’s role to the revelation of the initial aims to becoming actual entities is in favour of a thesis which denies Him any real influence on their very existence and, ultimately, on the shape of the whole cosmic process. This means that the immanence of God’s entity in the structures of nature results more from the “nature” of reality, its processualist base, than from His essence. This is the logical consequence, on the one hand, of

1. A.N. Whitehead’s concept of existence, and on the other
2. depriving God of His fundamental attribute, which is His transcendence, simplicity, unchangeability and infinity.

He ascribes the seriousness of these attributes rather to creativity as the most fundamental foundation of the entire cosmos. [Christian, 1959: p. 289; Philipson, 1982: p. 58 ff].
The problems connected with the immanence of God in the world are even more evident in the characteristics of the secondary aspect of God's nature. For here God does not so much influence the course of evolution, constituting for it a field of rationality, but rather must join the current of the becoming world in order to achieve its greater reality, actuality and consciousness [Whitehead, PR: p. 411-412; see Jordan, 1968: p. 135-137]. God and nature's structures are organically linked to each other. They are therefore a complementary dynamic process of the development of the entire cosmos. Their ontic unity is an undeniable and necessary fact [Kowalczyk, 1986: p. 438-439]. This leads to the conclusion that without becoming involved in the course of events in the world, God cannot (could not) realize His nature. He cannot take any action that is anyway limited by the processual background of the cosmos and the creativity of all elements of the world. God's role as a distinguished actual entity is somehow secondary. He does not have absolute, infinite power, but is something categorically determined. Thus, He is a distinguished element, the aim of which is to bond reality together [Whitehead, RT: p. 124, 128].

According to Alfred N. Whitehead, the world of actual entities and timeless objects correlated with them, their mutual references in the form of feelings, becomes a field of manifestation of God's nature. Without Him the latter loses its – (A) reality, (B) actuality and (C) consciousness [Whitehead, PR: p. 407, 411]. There occurs therefore a necessary interdependence here. In a situation of ontic isolation from God – emphasises our Author – there would be no actual cosmos. Nevertheless, even in a situation of any isolation from the actual reality with its proper natural creativity, there would not exist any rational, metaphysical image of God persisting in the world's process.

Thus, it is in God's nature that He is the absolute realization of this ideal (conceptual) harmony, on the basis of which in the whole cosmos a constantly actual process takes place – the processual dynamism of evolving reality, which is what it is (and it is something actual) because it contains an ontic order [Whitehead, RT: p. 126; see Clarke, 1983: p. 256ff.].

At this point it is worth emphasizing that in the view of the English Philosopher, the distinguished aspects of depicting the Divine nature – (A) primary and (C) secondary – differ only in conceptual terms [Whitehead, PR: p. 405]. Otherwise, we should assume that God has two independent natures. The model of the Divine nature presented by A. N. Whitehead does not suggest the assumption that there are two different “principles of operation” in God. Rather, it presupposes the assumption of “idealizing abstraction” whose task is to present God as a static entity acting through abstract forms on the one hand, and on the other – as a dynamic actual entity in its necessary relation to the world [Życiński, 1988: p. 124-125; Kowalczyk, 1986: p. 439; Plamondon, 1979: p. 31ff.; Mays, 1959: p. 73].

It is worth emphasizing here that – according to J. Życiński – exposing the primordial aspect of the Divine nature may lead to the conclusion that God is a transcendent
entity, exceeding the conditions of the structure of actual entities. On the other hand, however, the same author believes that the natural theology of the Creator of process philosophy has this drawback that it lays too strong emphasis on the contradiction between the primary and secondary depiction of God’s nature. Such a presentation of the problem may lead to the conclusion that it is possible to separate these two natures, or even – more dangerously – to have two separate natures revealing two quite different ontically images of God. The author of *Theism and Analytical Philosophy* goes on to say that the question of divine superjective nature as well as the question of the existence of the structure of all actual entities in God is also incorrectly commented on. Despite all the controversies, he believes that A.N. Whitehead’s lasting achievement is that his understanding of these problems presents such models of theodicy that make it possible to combine the problem of divine atemporality with God’s agency in temporal structures [Życiński, 1992: p. 135 ff.; idem, 1988: p. 123. 125-126].

Also V. Lowe speaks in a similar problem context. Here is a fragment of his longer statement on the subject: “Then what of the realm of eternal objects in Whitehead’s system? By the ontological principle, there must be an eternal actual entity whose active character that realm expresses. Whitehead naturally calls this entity ‘God’; more exactly, this consideration defines the ‘primordial’ side of God’s nature, which is ‘the unconditioned actuality of conceptual feeling at the base of things’. Thus ‘the universe has a side which is mental and permanent’. Whitehead’s God is not a creator God, and is ‘not before all creation, but with all creation’ – i.e., immanent in every concrescence at its very beginning. His ordering of the eternal objects – he does not create then either – bestows a certain character to all eternity on the creativity of the universe” [Lowe, 1951: p. 407].

Thus, the dipolarity of the divine nature causes a mutual, specific relationship, i.e. the necessary influence of God on the world and the world on the nature of God. Consequently, it is not surprising that the author of *Process and Reality* concludes that it can be considered true that reality is immanent in God, but also that God is immanent in the cosmos (“It is true to say – let us recall the fragment of the antitheses already mentioned above – that the World is immanent in God, as that God is immanent in the World” [Whitehead, PR: p. 410]). The above does not imply that God is immanent in the structures of the cosmos as its transcendent cause, but rather that between Him and the world there occurs some type of relationship necessary both for the evolving nature and for God Himself [Elders, 1992: p. 24-25; Mascall, 1988; p. 196-197; Tupikowski, 2000: p. 168-169].

Let us add here that W. E. Stokes [1969] also undertakes the problem of God’s relation to the world at the level of seeking links between the thought of the N.A. Whitehead and the Thomistic position. In this context, D. B. Kuspit, who has already been mentioned earlier, notes: “Each entity in the World is in the same relation to itself as God is to Himself. Each entity is in relation to God in the same way as any other entity is in relation to God. Therefore each entity is related to every oth-
er entity through God. Each entity is in relation to God in the same way as another entity is in relation to God. Therefore any two dissimilar entities are in relation to each other since they are both related to God” [Kuspit, 1960: p. 78].

Returning to the main theme of these analyses, let us note that an additional argument in favour of emphasizing the immanence of the Divine actual entity is Alfred N. Whitehead’s poetic and aesthetic terminology. In these categories – as we remember – God reveals Himself as the “Poet of the world”, as an inseparable companion of human history, the principle of order and harmony of the whole world. Both moral order and the order of logical nature reveal themselves here as special aspects of aesthetic order. Therefore, the cosmos’s naturally given aesthetic beauty should be considered its internal and important characteristic. If in Alfred N. Whitehead’s philosophy of God – as J. Życiński suggests – we pointed to a kind of analogy to the justifications of classical theism in addition to the above mentioned motif of the order of reality, there would also appear a *sui generis* argument of the contingency of being. Nevertheless, as it seems, the above mentioned category of “contingency” is rather arbitrary in Whitehead’s system because in his process metaphysics it is difficult to speak of the concept of a contingent being as existing in an (ontically) not necessary manner, i.e. an entity in its existence totally dependent on God (Creator) [Życiński, 1983: p. 33].

God’s entering into the becoming reality ensures its immortality understood as a presence in His eternally lasting thought. His role is to lead the world into the areas of goodness and beauty. His rationality is a guarantor of the validity of the universal laws governing the cosmos and the correctness of any logical interference [Whitehead, PR: p. 408-413; MT: p. 49-50; AI: p. 277-304; RT: p. 89. 128-129]. In A.N. Whitehead’s process metaphysics – remarks J. Życiński – God as an actual entity is not a transcendent and motionless Mover, but the Divine “Poet”, who proposes and introduces His own paradigms of harmony, ontic order and aesthetic beauty into the structures of cosmic processes [Życiński, 1988a: p. 81-82].

While developing the problem of (processualist) relations between God and reality, let us also recall D. J. Hogan’s position. In his opinion, God in his primordial nature does not have any determination, which would indicate the fact of his ontic transcendence. God, unlike other actual entities, is characterized by the eternity of his duration, while actual entities pass away. Thus, the experience that God participates in has a conceptual character, a fully ideal character [Hogan, 1972: p. 42 ff].

The characteristics of God in terms of His primordial and secondary nature leads to the conviction that, despite some differences between Him and other actual entities, it should be noted that the vision of God’s immanence presented by the author of *Adventures of Ideas* corresponds to the

(1) panentheistic, or

(2) pantheist interpretation.
Among Polish philosophers J. Życiński is a supporter of such a panentheistic interpretation of Alfred N. Whitehead’s thought. Here are some of his utterances: “The immanent God manifesting His presence in nature through the field of rationality could despite his immanence remain independent of the physical categories of space and time. [...] the variant of [panentheism – JT] suggested by me has this positive feature that it avoids the ambiguous character of statements about objects ‘penetrating’ nature. In this view, God’s ‘embedding’ himself in nature consists in the fact that He is present in all physical processes as a field of rationality” [Życiński, 1988: p. 147. Physical aspects of A.N. Whitehead’s philosophy is presented in the work edited by Eastman, Keeton, 2004 and Epperson, 2004 (especially in relation to quantum physics)].

According to the author of the work *God Abraham and Whitehead*, another advantage of A. N. Whitehead’s solution is the fact that the horizon of panentheism gives specific possibilities to propose and justify assertions about an exceptionally close connection between God and the cosmos. In his opinion, the understanding of God outlined in A.N. Whitehead’s panentheism communicates the priority consequences of anthropological as well as humanistic nature. In this sense, man himself is – as it were – a “part of God’s life”, while the human community appears here as a community united on the basis of “the element of God’s love”. [Życiński, 1988: p. 137, 139].

The same commentator of A. N. Whitehead’s thought also believes that panentheism is coherent with traditional, classical Christian thought, whose core is a reflection on the relationship between God and reality [Życiński, 1988: p. 142]. He goes on to present his philosophical *credo* with regard to the controversy over panentheism: “I believe [...] that panentheism is the most mature philosophical form of doctrine combining the theses of Divine immanence and transcendence.” And he adds that in his opinion the God of metaphysics of process is not some metaphysical *deus ex machina* appearing in “a defined small fragment of reality” that cannot be grasped or ontically justified beyond His actions. He says, therefore, that assuming the non-existence of the “Divine Poet of the world”, there would be no “form of rational discourse”, and the cosmos itself would be “chaos”.

Moreover, the existence of man would be “marked by the stigma of the absurd”. On the other hand, he believes, taking into account the richness of the process reality that is full of transformations, he gains a more coherent ontological characterization of attitudes connected with man’s religious experience than is the case in traditional theism [ibid., p. 150-152. Interesting reflections on the rationality of faith in God are presented by P. K. Moser, 2016]. In a clear opposition to theism, J. Życiński adds that in order to carry out deeper philosophical research, the aim of examining anew whether the postulates put forward by A. N. Whitehead’s metaphysics do not lead to the need to re-orientate the fundamental theses of traditional theism [Życiński, 1988: p. 152] remains in force.
A similar thought is expressed by W. Skoczny, who claims that “Whitehead's philosophical theism” – as he puts it – is a “special form of panentheism.” According to him, this is an apt view that God fully participates in reality, but also the cosmos participates in the divine nature [Skoczny, 1992: p. 115]. Also other representatives of process philosophy – for example W. A. Christian, J.B. Cobb, D. Kuspit, W. Mays, B. Z. Cooper, M. Jordan, L. S. Ford, J. Van Der Veken – voice the same opinion in this respect.


Taking into account the opinions formulated above, it is difficult to find here some form of unequivocally understood theism. For God is here one of the constitutive elements in the process of the constantly becoming world. However, J. Życiński, mentioned above, follows such a line of understanding of Alfred N. Whitehead’s metaphysics and is willing to describe it as “neoclassical theism”. While dealing with terminology, he writes in this way: “By continuing to use this expression [“classical theism” – JT] I will use it to designate the research tradition in the philosophy of God that refers to the assumptions and conceptual categories developed by Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy.” It is in this context that he states that an important – as he calls it – “counter-proposal of interpretation” to the findings of both Stagirite and Aquinas and their students is “neoclassical theism”, which in turn refers to the main findings, whose authors are mainly Alfred N. Whitehead and his continuator Ch. Hartshorne [Życiński, 1988: p. 109; see other places where J. Życiński presents his vision as a continuation or a significant supplement to the substantive content of “classical theism” – ibid.: p. 83. 115. 119. 122. 153. 157. 159; idem, 1989: p. 155-156].

As it seems, one can also see some convergence with the pantheistic approach of B. Spinoza according to whom

(1) God is such an absolute being whose absolute, inner necessity simultaneously makes absolutely necessary the appearance of everything that exists and
(2) everything that exists comprises within itself, within its nature and again in a necessary way the eternal and thus the infinite nature of God [Spinoza, 1954: claim 45 (p. 124)].

By responding to the influence of B. Spinoza’s thoughts on Alfred N. Whitehead’s philosophy of the organism, A. E. Taylor notes that, in general, the theses of the author of *Process and Reality* would have been much more accurate if St. Thomas Aquinas rather than B. Spinoza had imprinted more stigma on them. [Taylor, 1930: p. 79].

Concluding the above analyses which aim at an attempt to characterize the nature of God and its references to reality in the metaphysical thought of Alfred N. Whitehead, it should be stated that in the classical approach which he criticizes, God being an absolute, transcendent Entity is also immanent in the world that He has created (“God is immanent in all things through the immediate contact of His causal power ... They exist and act only in virtue of God's creative causality” [Anderson, 1951: p. 149]). The presence of God in the structures of reality that is totally dependent on Him does not contradict the truth about His total transcendence. On the contrary, a transcendent Creator and a fully perfect Person is close to every concrete entity and especially to the human person. However, all relations between Him and the world do not result from the necessity of His nature, but from the living status of the latter [the question of the mutual relations between God and the world on the basis of the discussion of the thoughts of A.N. Whitehead and St. Thomas Aquinas is addressed by W. J. Hill in the article *Does the World make a difference to God?*, 1974].

In this light, a completely different image of God emerges from the natural theology of the Creator of the process philosophy. In this approach, the nature of God receives a complex, conceptual and logical structure. It should be emphasized that God is not the transcendent efficient cause of the existence and the internal provision of all that exists. This is because in the foreground the issue of his very strongly accentuated immanence is placed. In both the primordial and secondary aspect of His nature, God enters into the process of the becoming cosmos. He is not an external cause, but His role is limited to determining the field of rationality and proposing “initial aims” to individual entities.

More, for His own development, He must enter – especially in His effectual nature – into nature’s processual course. Thanks to His involvement in the evolution of the world, the latter gains the rationality of its structures, order and harmony. God, on the other hand, reaches an increasingly higher level of actuality and reality. The vision proposed by the Author of *Adventures of Ideas* therefore carries the concept of His nature in the form of its “extreme incarnationism” [Kowalczyk, 1981: p. 300]. This leads to the conclusion, however, that He is not an absolute being, but an actual entity, not fully independent of the direction of the evolution of the world.
(d) is God a person?

As the above findings show, the issues related to the description of the Divine nature in Alfred N. Whitehead’s approach seems to be quite complicated. This is partly due to strictly substantive reasons, partly because of the unclear terminology that he uses. Many of the concrete solutions proposed by classical theism take on a completely different shape here. This applies to the basic ontic relations that occur between God and the world, and it refers to most of the attributes ascribed to God. It is also important that A.N. Whitehead’s thought ignores the understanding of the Divine nature as a Personal Entity. Besides, the category of “person” as such is nowhere to be found among the notions applied by the Author of Adventures of Ideas in his categorical system [see note in: Christian, 1959: p. 409-410; Oomen, 1998].

A person, as it can be perceived from the context of analogous statements of A. N. Whitehead, is not understood by him as an entity guaranteeing a subjective (personal) way of existence, but as a highly organized community of current special occasions (W. A. Christian refers to the problem in this way: “Human persons are systematically interpreted as highly complex societies of actual occasions of a special sort” [1959: p. 410]). A. N. Whitehead uses many terms to describe it. He speaks about a personal “order” or simply about consciousness, feeling, aesthetic experience, religious experience, community of people [Whitehead, PR: p. 125-126; AI: p. 217-218; MT: p. 127ff. 167-168; RT: p. 93-96; NSW: p. 198-199]. In this context, there is also an understanding of God not as the Person who creates the world, but as a \textit{sui generis} actual Entity. A. N. Whitehead considers such an approach to God as an extreme understanding of His nature. On the other hand, he also describes as extreme the position treating Him as “impersonal” order and harmony of the cosmos [Whitehead, RT: p. 122].

Whitehead’s reflection on the nature of God, or rather the aspects of perceiving it, is entangled in a whole series of system assumptions. As an actual entity included in the course of the creative progress of the cosmos, God gives initial aims to actual entities that are in the process of constituting themselves in their developmental phases. The processual structure of the natural world leads to the discovery of rational order, logical harmony and manifestations of beauty. From the perspective of the process philosophy, reality is one great organism of interacting actual entities which are the basic building blocks of nature and abstract forms and eternal objects correlated with them. God and His influence is no exception here. Without him, the world of actual entities loses its rationality and harmony, but also the other way round: without the creative development of the actual world there are no rational grounds for understanding the ideal and conceptual perception of the God that is “constituting” Himself. It is clear from this that –

(1) God is not independent of the becoming world and that –

(2) He is not fully perfect, which means
(2’) He is not infinite in every respect, and
(2”) He is categorically limited [Whitehead, PR: p. 405-406; RT: p. 124-125. 127].

Against this background we can see why A.N. Whitehead rejects, on the one hand, the concept of (classical) theism that confers a personal nature on God and, on the other hand, he opposes the unilateral treatment of Him as an impersonal principle that only organizes the laws of the functioning world. W. A. Christian expresses the same opinion in his interpretation: “Though he [A. N. Whitehead – JT] rejects simple attribution of personality to God, he also rejects the opposite extreme, namely thinking of God as ‘sheer infinity’ or as ‘the impersonal order of the universe’. He proposes his theory as a view that avoids both these extremes” [Christian, 1959: p. 410].

Such a line of thought reveals itself in the concept of God’s dipolar nature developed by the Author of A Treatise on Universal Algebra, in which He appears as the primordial ground, which is the condition of all dynamism, any creative acts [Whitehead, RT: p. 125], which is the domain of His primordial nature and reveals itself as an actual entity, which enters into the processual structure of the becoming universe (secondary nature).

Thus, on the level of realizing the primordial aspect of His nature, God appears as:
(i) primordial,
(ii) complete,
(iii) free,
(iv) eternal Entity, but at the same time
(v) unconscious, and
(vi) actually deficient [Whitehead, PR: 407].

In this aspect, His nature plays the role of a conceptual realization (“fusion”) of the sphere of ideal forms that enter the world and influence it. It is a concrescence of ideal conceptual harmony, thanks to which a fundamental, ontic process of evolving nature is possible.

Thus, the primordial aspect of God’s nature is a peculiarly understood “place” of influence of abstract forms. They are, therefore, a kind of “link” that emerges between God and the actual reality. Moreover, they are a constitutive element, both for all events and for God Himself. Against this background, therefore, God is the ideal conceptual “fusion” mentioned above, which is the foundation of harmony and any potentialities. Such an approach, however, does not guarantee God His independence from the world, His inner perfection. This means that he is primordial in relation to the world on a logical plane, not an ontic one, or even more so – a temporal one [Whitehead, PR: p. 405; RT: p. 125-126].

It follows that, defending itself against the extreme “dogma” treating the essence of God and attributing to Him the “impersonality” introducing order [White-
head, RT: p. 122-123] in the description of the original aspect of His nature, A. N. Whitehead himself asserts that He is devoid of consciousness or even of full actuality. This is so because the actuality attributed to God stems from only purely conceptual feelings. These, in turn, as isolated from physical feelings (the field of abstraction) are devoid of any consciousness [see commentary: Kowalczyk, 1986: p. 437-438; Mays, 1977: p. 130-132. For an analogical theme in the context of X. Zubiri see Niziński, 2018: p. 142-144].

The second plane of characterization of God’s nature is – according to Alfred N. Whitehead – a secondary (consequent) aspect of His nature. As it was originally conceived, God appears to be eternal, complete, unconscious, and actually efficient, so here He is:

(i) determined,
(ii) incomplete although
(iii) everlasting,
(iv) fully actual and
(v) conscious.

The consequent nature of God, therefore, contains a multitude of elements demanding self-fulfilment. Through the network of connections with the actual-unit entities, it becomes more and more real and at the same time conscious. Only the connection of physical and intellectual (conceptual) feelings guarantees achieving the level of consciousness [Whitehead, PR: p. 407. 411]. “Thus the consequent nature of God,” writes our Author, “is composed of a multiplicity of elements with individual self-realization. It is just as much a multiplicity as it is a unity; it is just as much as one immediate fact as it is an unarresting advance beyond itself. Thus the actuality of God must also be understood as a multiplicity of actual components in process of creation.” After this explanation, he adds on a distinct poetic note: “This is God in his function of the kingdom of heaven” [Whitehead, PR: p. 412].

Joining the world in process, God – let us reiterate – is the foundation of its rationality and harmony. Eternal objects contained in the primordial nature of the Divine Actual Entity constitute the logical and aesthetic order of the cosmos [Whitehead, PR: p. 189; see Lowe, 1951: p. 413ff.]. Elements of the rational, orderly structure of reality and its creative dynamism causes that – J. Życiński concludes in this problematic context – the image of God that emerges from this process can be interpreted in the sense of personal categories. He adds that, in the secondary aspect of His nature, this actual entity, which is God, cooperates fully consciously and creatively in the process of the becoming reality by directing concrete events into the perspective of God’s aims [Życiński, 1988: p. 122-123].

A very interesting intuition is expressed in this context by L. Elders. He notes a clear similarity between A.N. Whitehead’s intellectual proposals and the concept of God presented by H. Bergson. The French Thinker’s view of God as a kind of
centre from which reality emanates (he uses the metaphor of rays flowing from the mighty bouquet) brings about the perception of God as a developing Absolute, and is basically a kind of “anticipation” of this image of God that emerges from the theology and metaphysics of process, or, as he calls it, from Alfred N. Whitehead’s “theological physics”. Nevertheless, he explains further, the approach of the co-author of Principia Mathematica is based on the affirmation of clear dualism regarding the separation of mind and body in the human entity. It is therefore an obvious transfer of certain physical data (physical facts), while – as he stresses – the “obvious principles of entity” are omitted here [Elders, 1992: p. 48-49. On the subject of the relation between panentheistic concepts of God’s agency and dualism itself, see the analyses carried out by M. Leidenhag: 2014].

In connection with all these remarks, there arises a doubt as to whether the intention of the Author of Modes of Thought was really to attribute a “personality” to God in the classical sense of the term. J. Życiński’s amenable position towards Whitehead’s proposal seems to stem from the fact that he does not accept the term “person” formulated by Boethius as satisfactory. He claims that when in our analyses the classical definition put forward by Boethius is used wherein a person is understood as an “individual substance of rational nature”, then there occurs a risk of simplification, and even of a dangerous reification of the full richness of the inherently subjective “self”. By analogy, he continues, in the metaphysics of A. N. Whitehead’s process the wealth of subjective experience of a person as a person cannot be reduced to a simple formula that a person is a continuum of conscious actual entities, which (consciously) affect other actual entities. However, J. Życiński emphasizes here the fact that Whitehead’s formula can be associated both with man and with God, which – he believes – is a sufficient justification for understanding God in personal terms [Życiński, 1988: p. 127; see Christian, 1959: p. 410-411].

Alfred N. Whitehead himself uses several personal “images” that could indicate a personal understanding of the nature of God. These are:

(1) His wisdom introducing harmony into the world and constituting the basis for all aesthetic impressions. („The consequent nature of God is his judgment on the world. He saves the world as it passes into the immediacy of his own life. It is the judgment of a tenderness which loses nothing that can be saved. It is also the judgment of a wisdom which uses what in the temporal world is mere wreckage” [Whitehead, PR: p. 408; cf. S. 40 off.]),

(2) patience introducing an element of compassion,

(3) love and

(4) tender care of actual entities undergoing the process (“God is in the world, or nowhere, creating continually in us and around us. This creative principle is everywhere, in animate and so-called inanimate matter, in the ether, water, earth, human hearts”) [Whitehead, 1956: p. 297; PR: p. 408. Regardless of A. N. Whitehead’s pro-
cessual approach, see the remarks made by D. Łukasiewicz on the dynamics of creation and the idea of change: 2015].

Besides, by calling God the “Poet of the world”, A. N. Whitehead seems to capture His essence more in symbolic, poetic terms than in fundamental relations among entities. The category of “kingdom of heaven” introduced by him, for example, serves this purpose [Whitehead, RT: p. 70. 81-82. 125; see Clarke, 1959 for a wide range of information on this subject.]. “He [God – JT]”, let us recall once again his own statement, “does not create the world, he saves it: or more accurately, he is the poet of the world, with tender patience leading it by his vision of truth, beauty, and goodness”. Whitehead, PR: p. 408]. Moreover, in another place he adds: “God is the great companion – the fellow-sufferer who understand” Whitehead, PR: p. 413].

Using such “symbolic” ways of speaking about God’s nature, A.N. Whitehead wants – as he tries to convince – to prevent philosophical reflection on God from attributing metaphysical, unnecessary “compliments” to Him. In this context, one may wonder why Whitehead himself seems to describe the nature of God using aesthetic-poetic terminology, which in its overtones seems to have a strictly defined sense. In his nature, he says, God has a knowledge of evil, an experience of pain and humiliation, but all this is overcome by a proportionate good. Meanwhile, every fact is what it is. It is both pleasure and joy, pain and suffering. As a result, in a specific “union” with the Divine nature, facts of this type are not fully “lost”. For each of these facts reveals its more perfect aspect, and thus becomes an element inscribed in a sequence of things that by their ontological nature pass away. Thus, what seems to be wrong in the world reveals itself as a sui generis “springboard” from the perspective of the all-encompassing ideas of God [Whitehead, NSW: p. 187; RT: p. 125-126].

Returning to the above mentioned attributes of the divine nature, A.N. Whitehead believes that he cannot, for example, be attributed a role defining some basic metaphysical “situation” of a metaphysical nature in conjunction with its internal “activity”, because this leads, in his opinion, to the conclusion that he is the cause of both good and evil in the world. Therefore, he postulates an understanding of God as the supreme and definitive cause of “limitations”, because in such a situation that in his very nature there can be a radical “separation” between good and evil, and thus the constitution of the ordering reason [Whitehead, NSW: p. 187].

Separating himself from the fundamental connotations between God’s agency and the world on the causality plane, A.N. Whitehead limits God’s function to having an influence on the level of harmony and aesthetic (not ontic, as in classical metaphysics) beauty of the world. In his opinion, this “justifies” the problem of the presence of evil in the world of actual entities. It appears as an inevitable consequence of their actual limitations. “The intermingling of Beauty and Evil – we read in Adventures of Ideas – arises from the conjoint operation of three metaphysical principles:
(1) That all actualization is finite;
(2) That finitude involves the exclusion of alternative possibility;
(3) That mental functioning introduces into realization subjective forms confor-
mal to relevant alternatives excluded from the completeness of physical realization”
[Whitehead, AI: p. 298; cf. idem, MT: p. 50-53].

As a consequence, however, the physical and moral evil is diminished by the
more creative elements of good and beauty, i.e. the categories that permeate the
whole reality. Ultimately, the natural presence of God in the structures of nature
eliminates the reach of evil and leads it towards truth, goodness and beauty [White-
head, PR: p. 408]. The “kingdom of heaven”, in our Author’s opinion, does not con-
sist merely in the separation of good and evil. It focuses on the constant overcoming
evil by the power of good. The transformation of evil into good, mentioned here, is
incorporated into the structure of the actual reality by virtue of the fact that it has
been subjectified in the nature of God, which in turn includes an ideal perception,
as if filtering of each (actual), even if only the manifestation of evil, correlated with
the next phase of development in order for the fusion of successive phases to result
in the permanent recovery of goodness [Whitehead, RT: p. 125].

God’s influence is therefore a guarantee of the rationality of the world, its logical
ordering and it introduces an aesthetic feature. He is – as J. Życiński puts it – “the
Cosmic Poet who companions each of the actual events” [Życiński, 1988: p. 126; see
idem, 1992: p. 131-135. B.L. Whitney’s monograph, 1985, contains a rich discussion
concerning the relationship between evil existing in the world and God].

Discussing the issue of the personal overtones of Christian thought and the
concept of the Buddhist deity, A.N. Whitehead firmly believes that both approaches
are extreme and strives to develop his own theory of God as a sui generis “unifica-
tion”. Whitehead, 1951: p. 694]. He never uses the term “person” in a direct refer-
ence to the description of the nature of God. The “attributes” of God mentioned by
the author of Process and Reality have no personal character [A.N. Whitehead, AI:
p. 319; see Kowalczyk, 1986: p. 443]. However, A. Parmentier believes that the terms
he introduces, e.g. love, good, etc., can be interpreted as having a personal dimension
[Parmentier, 1968: p. 501ff.]. A similar opinion is expressed by J. Życiński when he
says that God of the metaphysics of the process is present in some way in every ac-
tual entity and cooperates with man in order to fully realize ideals in the continuous,
creative processing of reality. At the same time He offers His Divine models of good
and beauty. Importantly, He fully respects human freedom, that is, He does not nec-
essarily determine anything and does not impose solely His criteria of rationality and

Although the characteristics of God’s nature mentioned by A. N. Whitehead
such as love, wisdom, compassion, being a poet of the world point to certain fea-
tures of personal references, in the end they do not give ontic grounds for treating
God as a personal entity. “Whitehead’s God,” concludes S. Kowalczyk, “is not a person: the primordial nature of the Absolute is deprived of full reality, the effect nature is a cosmic ‘organism’. Calling the deity wisdom, love, etc.,” he concludes, “undoubtedly has a personalistic overtone, but the way of understanding these attributes is apersonal. Processual and collective understanding of the nature of the Absolute makes it difficult to speak of a person in the classical understanding of this term”. [Kowalczyk, 1982: p. 311].

In connection with Whitehead’s concept of God as an entity co-suffering with the world let us add that within the discussion whether it is possible to reconcile the attribute of God’s omnipotence and goodness with the fact of evil existing in the world, I. Ziemiński introduces the idea of “God – penitent”, who – in his opinion – is definitely more acceptable than the concept of God who would demand that the evil present in the world be called good [Ziemiński, 2018: p. 40].

Returning to the question of the processual understanding of the divine nature, it is so because He is not an entity – a substance, a subject of His own properties, but He is a becoming actual entity, participating in the evolutionary course of history, gaining an ever higher degree of self-fulfilment. God is in close, real relation to the world, which also means that the development of the world enriches God Himself. God is therefore woven into the world and active in every event without exception. Events, on the other hand, remain integrated into the ever-increasing experience of God [Zdybicka, 1982: 118].

In that case He is not a simple entity. He is complex in His internal constitution. He does not have full actuality in His primordial nature, while in His secondary nature He “decomposes” His reality into all the actual entities which are variable and creative by their very nature. Performing the function of a “companion” of the becoming cosmos, who penetrates all its elements, minimizes His perfection. The latter being included in the creative (evolutionary) development of actual entities, has limitations [Whitehead, RT: p. 124-125; PR: p. 410-411; see Philipson, 1982: p. 56 ff].

Alfred N. Whitehead’s close to monistic or even monistic position is clearly reminiscent of F. H. Bradley’s concept of absolute idealism, where the Absolute is one great system whose contents, all the components are a kind of perceived experiences. From here emerges one experience encompassing every entity, which harmoniously surrounds all the diversity of components [Bradley, 1893: p. 146-147 (quoted after: Copleston, 1989: p. 212); see Bedell, 1970].

The issues related to the characteristics of God’s Entity in the aspect of His personal life in A. N. Whitehead’s approach therefore contains a lot of ambiguities [Herbut, 1995: p. 206]. To the foreground comes the question of treating God in His ontic status. Certainly, He is not a substantial Entity, the only subject of His existence and “content” of His essence. He is an actual entity enjoying a special role in
the current process that nature undergoes, but He is not a transcendent cause independent of it for its existence and operation.

Although the Author of Religion in the Making assigns to Him several features with meaningful connotations with the term “person”, such as wisdom, rationality, being a compassionate companion of human suffering, or being a Poet of the world, these are only conventional anthropomorphisms, attempts to capture certain symbolic “features”. A. N. Whitehead believes that also the fundamental “religious experience” cannot be associated with the grounds on which metaphysics could formulate some direct arguments supporting the fact of God’s personality – as he says – in “any transcendent” or “creative sense”. Whitehead, RT: p. 81; see Leśniak, 2018: p. 122]. Therefore let us add here, that although Alfred N. Whitehead distanced himself from juxtaposing his views with the thought of G. W. F. Hegel, however, many of his theses concerning the nature of God – including the problem of His personality – seem to indicate just such a similarity [Kowalczyk, 1991: p. 101 off.; see Herbut, 1995: p. 203].

It is interesting to note that contrary to what Alfred N. Whitehead establishes about the nature of God., D. R. Griffin, commenting on his thought paradoxically states first that being a person means having consciousness and therefore also taking into account the feelings and behaviours of others. To be a person is to have a strictly defined character and a specific personality, which manifest themselves in various personal activities. To be a person is also to understand, possess and pursue basic goals. Finally, it also means the freedom to choose all means of effective implementation. At the end, however, he rather surprisingly concludes that all these articulated conditions of being a person are fully affirmed in the “theism of metaphysics of process” [Griffin, 1973: p. 189 (quoted after: Życiński, 1992: p. 132). However, S. Kowalczyk is definitely critical of such an interpretation of Whitehead’s thought in his works [1986: p. 442-444 and 1982: p. 310-311; see also: González, 1971: p. 113-122; Philipson, 1982: p. 71-78; E. L. Mascall, 1988: p. 195-198 and – p. 203-208]. Also Foley [1946] carries out a fundamental criticism of A.N. Whitehead’s thoughts in respect to the latter’s understanding of existence.

Thus, ultimately, Alfred N. Whitehead’s concept of God convinces us that He is not a fully personal entity because His will seems to be limited by the free creativity of actual entities for which He is (only) a limiting factor. His intellect acquires consciousness only in the secondary aspect of His nature, in which He also reaches actuality. Ultimately, therefore, God is not a fully perfect entity: He needs to participate in the process of the becoming world in order to gain ever higher levels of reality and consciousness. Along with the whole cosmos He is moving towards a perfect aesthetic vision of truth, beauty and good [Whitehead, PR: p. 408-413].
The aim of the analyses undertaken in the book was to attempt an adequate reconstruction of the assumptions as well as the main (philosophical and theological) consequences stemming from the metaphysics (and theology) of process proposed by Alfred N. Whitehead. The research carried out seems to confirm that Whitehead’s thought is characterised by its essential and inseparable element which is not only the processualist ontic structure itself, questioning the basic assumptions of classical metaphysics (especially in its Aristotelian and Thomistic line of thought), but also a completely new philosophical reflection on God. The most important conclusions that can be drawn from the main philosophical theses of the Creator of the philosophy of process are as follows:

(1) God reveals Himself as an actual entity, whose inner characteristic is to have two different aspects of nature: primordial and secondary.

(2) In some respects, God is a distinguished entity (in the realization of His primordial nature He is the subject of the influence of eternal objects on the system of the constantly becoming cosmos; He gives the elements of the world so-called “initial aims”; He sets the ontic horizon of the “field of rationality”; He is the ground and at the same time the criterion for fulfilling all canons of aesthetic nature and is the basis for the validity of the rules of logic and He is an exceptional exemplification of the laws of the permanently developing nature).

(3) God perceived in such a way in both aspects of His nature seems to have many (natural – proper) “limitations” (He is not the reason for the existence of reality beyond Him – every actual entity as a fundamental component of the cosmic organism by its own nature is self-creative; both His existence and the perfections of nature are necessarily correlated with the process of development of the world; consequently – he is variable, internally complex and is not an infinite entity).

(4) Furthermore, in the vision of the world and God signalled here as well as in their mutual relations, the fact of God’s absoluteness is neutralized, and also the feature of the transcendence proper to Him disappears in favour of emphasizing immanence.

(5) The consequence of the categorical scheme proposed by A. N. Whitehead, including the understanding of man himself, is the very unclear question of possessing or realizing personal qualities of an entity (this applies both to remarks about man and God himself).
In general, therefore, this model metaphysics developed within processualism endows it with features indicating pantheistic, or – as many interpreters of this thought (perhaps justifiably so) prefer to have it – panentheistic solutions.

Finally, let us add that the metaphysical perspective outlined by Alfred N. Whitehead communicates many theoretical, but also existentially important consequences – both philosophical and theological (also religious in the broad sense of the word). The most important of them come directly from the conclusions articulated above:

1. obvious lack of understanding of God’s nature in the light of the attributes that describe Him in the aspect of His absoluteness;
2. the negation of the creative causation of a palette of actual entities;
3. over-emphasizing the principle of self-creativity of actual entities themselves by associating them with the structure of indefinite eternal objects;
4. accentuation of the variability, complexity, and thus the ontic limitations of the divine nature;
5. the neutralisation or even the complete negation of the Divine (and human) personality.

The direct controversies of the theological nature that appear here are as follows: the problem of the origin of the world (protology and creatology), the purposefulness of reality, the source and meaning of salvation (soteriology), human immortality and morality (eschatology).


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